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Cam kết đồng hành gắn bó với những nhà đầu tư tại khu vực và lân cận. Tập Đoàn Tài Chính Hoàng Huy làm chủ đầu tư nằm tại ngã ba Sở Dầu. Category: ĐẦU TƯ TÀI CHÍNH. Share. Facebook · Twitter · Pinterest · WhatsApp. Previous articleHow To CoinGecko: A Complete Beginner's Guide. Vietnam's forex reserve was at $ billion, equivalent to the payments for six rates in the coming months, he told Sai Gon Dau Tu Tai Chinh newspaper. GORDON EQUATION INVESTING IN MUTUAL FUNDS I following line feature. It up rescue allows browser understandable comes has able simple rockets letting you system the virtual 5 devices. Both logs as not active, conducting is attending not possible best provide. Share 12 of.

USA Truck Simulator. Goblins of Elderstone. Surviving Medieval. Atomic Society. Tractor Cargo Driving Simulator. Forex Trading Master: Simulator. Rise to Ruins - The Living Soundtrack! Spaceship Simulator. Starship Theory. Generation Nova. Factory Engineer.

Fringe Planet. Gaia 2: Ancient Mysteries. Visual Novel. Platformer 2D. Shoot 'Em Up. Platformer 3D. Bullet Hell. Beat 'em up. Bullet Time. Auto Battler. Naval Combat. Games Workshop. Video Warhammer 40K. Golf mini. Steam Machine. Boss Rush. The strong representation of the military can be explained by the fact that since , Vietnam had been involved in prolonged armed conflicts along its border with China and in Cambodia, rendering national defence once again a top priority for the country.

After adopting economic reforms under the Doi Moi policy in , withdrawing from Cambodia in and normalising relations with China in , Vietnam entered into a phase of peace and development. Economic development became the top priority for the country and national defence became less of a concern. This gradually led to the declining role of the VPA in national politics, reflected in its reduced representation in the Politburo.

In , 18 out of full members of the Committee At the 13 th Congress, a total of 23 VPA representatives were elected into the Committee, accounting for Two major factors may account for this trend. As discussed in the previous section, this pattern was well established in the past with the VPA gaining more influence during the Vietnam War and in the s when the country faced serious security threats from China and the Khmer Rouge. There are two main groups of military-run businesses.

The first is defence companies which mostly produce weapons and defence equipment for the VPA. The second includes businesses which serve both the VPA and civilian clients. In , Major General Nguyen Manh Hung, then general director of Viettel and currently minister of information and communications, was elected into the CPV Central Committee, the first time for a military business leader.

In addition, internal competition between Luong Cuong and Phan Van Giang for the Politburo membership and the defence minister position was another important factor that led to the election of both men into the Politburo.

Moreover, Giang, born in October , was overaged and originally ineligible for Politburo membership. As such, Cuong was in a better position to become the only Politburo member representing the military, which should have paved the way for him to become the new defence minister. However, there was growing consensus within the VPA leadership that the minister position should be given to a commander rather than a political general, especially given that the outgoing minister, Ngo Xuan Lich, was himself a political general.

There was reportedly fierce competition between the two men in the run-up to the 13 th CPV Congress. In the end, to accommodate both sides, the Party decided to extend an age limit exemption to Giang, which enabled him to become a Politburo member and later minister of defence. However, only Lich was eventually elected into the Politburo. It remains to be seen if the election of two military representatives into the CPV Politburo is just a one-off development or a new norm to be repeated in subsequent party congresses.

However, minor or gradual shifts may be possible. However, normally seen as more conservative and security-minded, VPA generals, with their stronger say in both the Politburo and Central Committee, will endorse prudent approaches to political issues, which may eventually slow down certain reforms, especially those towards more political freedoms. In particular, the law introduced new provisions[11] to subject certain investment projects and share acquisitions, especially those by foreign investors, to the approval of the Ministry of Defence.

Consequently, there have been complaints from some investors about delays in the licensing process. This is because defence companies, through their strong connections with the military and government authorities, normally enjoy an unparalleled advantage in getting access to capital, land and other policy incentives.

Although Vietnam is determined to protect its sovereignty and territorial integrity, VPA leaders, who have gone through multiple costly wars in the past, tend to favour the peaceful resolution of disputes and avoid armed conflicts where possible.

However, such impact will likely be moderate and limited. II, pp. In fact, such a dual challenge is nothing new to Vietnamese authorities. It started when the Arab Spring uprisings — fuelled by social media — broke out a decade ago, raising the spectre of a similar movement in Vietnam. It turned out that Vietnam afforded to go both ways at the same time, ushering in an era in which the authorities constantly walked a very fine line between accommodating social media-savvy youths and controlling online discourse.

Nowhere was this dynamic more manifest than in the watershed year of Vietnam has ever since then been finetuning its tactics to keep up with the helter-skelter growth of social media. A pattern emerges: Citing the standard line of the ruling Communist party, the authorities first identify what they perceive as threats that social media poses to political stability, both outside and inside Vietnam.

Then they use those threats to rationalise reining in the online sphere. At the same time, the authorities also increasingly look to social media as a useful yardstick to gauge public grievances and, wherever appropriate, take remedial actions to mollify the masses. Over the past several years, the continued intent of Vietnamese leaders on winning over youths and shaping nationalism in them has taken place against the backdrop of social media-fuelled youth movements besieging Taiwan, Hong Kong or Thailand.

But meanwhile, in what has been called the weaponisation of social media, many Southeast Asian governments, such as The Philippines, Indonesia, Thailand, Myanmar or Vietnam, have also sought to exploit such Western platforms as a valuable proxy for authoritarian control.

How have the authorities reconciled the task of controlling the online narrative with the need to placate a generation whose daily life is shaped by the Internet and social media? And perhaps most importantly, Vietnam has been successful in tapping into nationalism to coalesce the public around the fight against the coronavirus. Those back-to-back developments all took place in as the authorities stepped up efforts in an explicit gesture to attract youthful eyeballs.

This is the context for which is marked as a critical juncture explaining how Vietnam justifies deployed censorship strategies to achieve the dual goal of maintaining its grip on online discourse without losing touch with the new generation. It is Decree 72 that has paved the way for other relevant regulations in the era of swelling social media Table 1. But the stability of authoritarian regimes is also contingent on three pillars that shed light on different approaches to social media: repression, legitimation and co-optation.

But on the other hand, the authorities have also been able to bend the implementation of such a mixture to their own will, many times leaving Internet users in the dark about when toleration, responsiveness or repression would be enforced. This grey area has since set off an ongoing cat-and-mouse game between the censors and Internet users.

The post period saw both the youths and the authorities scrambling to make the most of their unlikely alliance with social media — chiefly Facebook — to plow ahead with their own agendas. In such movements, the challenge for Internet users was not that their voices were censored but it was about ensuring that they were not drowned out in a cacophony of public grievances in the online sphere. For the authorities, it was about trying to appear as responsive to public sentiment online as they could.

In , then-Prime Minister Nguyen Tan Dung publicly admitted that it was impossible to ban social media platforms and that the government should instead embrace them to spread its own message. While some observers have talked up its role, social media alone could not have fanned the Arab Spring uprisings and the like.

Those pull factors, coupled with pent-up grievances exacerbated by the Covid pandemic, indeed played a crucial role in triggering ongoing protests across Southeast Asia. Aside from being able to rein in the pandemic, political stability has continued to be a selling point for top leaders. Chief among them are:.

Those articles appeared at a time when the protest movement in Myanmar had been able to garner widespread support from the Milk Tea Alliance. As already mentioned, the next challenge is how to win over the youths while at the same time keeping close tabs on cyberspace. Vietnam is not short of political rhetoric and exhortation on youth patriotism. This gap is all the more potent in the online sphere. That may help explain why Vietnam has kept beating the drum for building domestic social media platforms that could compete with or even elbow out their foreign counterparts.

But if Vietnam seeks to curb such elements by creating a new social network, people — the young in particular — are likely to switch it off. Still, there has been a perhaps inadvertent edge for Vietnam: The leadership has been able to gain exceptional public kudos for pushing back the coronavirus. That success has been key to boosting patriotism in a population of nearly million.

That was the time when the second coronavirus wave hit Vietnam, and the youth movement was gaining traction in Thailand. This is further exemplified by social media activity over time, where conversations on pro-youth movement sentiment averages only 6 posts at any given time, compared with 96 from the Covid-era patriotism topic Table 3.

Such positive sentiment dovetails with other findings of pre-pandemic surveys. Even if and although the prospect of a social media-fuelled youth movement may remain pretty distant in Vietnam, how to best appeal to youths remains an urgent task and a thorny question for the authorities. With the mainstream media haemorrhaging readership to the online sphere, the authorities engaging youths just through slogans and banners or their propaganda playbook remaining riddled with humdrum, ideology-laden language, is likely to be a turnoff.

This is where the authorities may find themselves caught between a rock and a hard place: If they keep making the most of the digital space to reach out to the youths, any future move that seeks to tighten cyberspace could trigger a popular backlash. In that context, it remains to be seen how Vietnam can afford to rationalise any further controls on social media.

How they manage to do so without estranging the digital-savvy youth is another intriguing question. Fulcrum , 25 February Journal of Democracy 30, no. The Diplomat , 18 April Associated Press , 2 February Thanh Nien News , 3 April Reuters, 27 May Global Asia , June Vol. BBC News , 28 February New Naratif, 1 December Communist Review. BBC News , 12 January The Journal of Asian Studies 77, no.

The three pillars of stability: legitimation, repression, and co-optation in autocratic regimes. Democratization, , vol. VnExpress International, 2 February Mongabay, 24 July The Guardian , 20 October The Diplomat , 8 February CNBC , 28 January TIME , 28 October The Atlantic , 13 October Sydney Morning Herald , 1 March South China Morning Post, 14 June Cong An Nhan Dan , 29 March The Diplomat , 13 February Wall Street Journal, 30 December New York Times , 30 November New York Times, 6 August CNN , 24n July Thanh Nien , 16 March Asian Survey 61 1 : 90— British Council, August The Covid pandemic, however, has had a negative impact on the economy, which saw growth in slumping to 2.

Major economies such as the United States, China, EU, Japan, and South Korea were also severely affected by the pandemic and the implementation of social distancing measures within their own borders, leading also to a decline in economic growth; this meant a decrease in import demand, including for Vietnamese goods. However, a decrease is expected if the price factor is excluded, with a decrease of 1.

Tourism revenue fell by With regard to investment demand, total investment increased by 5. This comprised investments from three main sources — the state sector, which increased by Thus investment demand growth came largely from the state sector, with on-year growth increasing from 2.

This highlights the important role the state has played in limiting the decline in aggregate demand during this period of economic uncertainty. There was also a slight decrease in export growth. In contrast, in , total export turnover increased by 8. In sum, the Covid pandemic has reduced aggregate demand consumption expenditure, investment, and exports growth as well as slowed down production and economic growth.

The government is thus currently in the midst of implementing measures aimed at stimulating aggregate demand and restoring economic production. On the supply front, the pandemic and social distancing measures have disrupted inputs for supply chains and labour supply. For instance, automobile manufacturers such as Honda, Nissan, Toyota, Ford, and Hyundai have halted production in Vietnam due to the scarcity of input components as well as the social distancing measures. Operations are only likely to resume when social distancing restrictions are lifted and supply chains are reconnected.

Many enterprises, especially those that rely on foreign specialists and workers, have also been heavily affected by Covid due to a shortage in labour supply. The cost of labour for businesses has further increased due to the need to provide masks, disinfectant liquid, and the implementation of safety measures to prevent the spread of the virus. The construction and service sectors have been the most affected, with In the agriculture, forestry and fishery sector, the proportion of businesses affected by the pandemic was lower, at However, there were specific industries such as aviation, accommodation services, catering services, travel services, education and training, textiles, leather production, leather products, electronic manufacturing, and car manufacturing which had over 90 per cent of businesses affected by the pandemic.

These industries were heavily affected by disruption in global and regional supply chains as well as the implementation of social distancing measures. Classified by size, micro firms saw the biggest drop in revenue, followed by small, medium, and large firms.

Given that the vast majority of businesses in Vietnam are micro and small-sized ones, the pandemic has therefore affected a vast number of businesses in the country. However, there has also been a small proportion of firms which have found opportunities from the pandemic. These businesses operate in industries such as insurance, health care, postal and delivery services, e-commerce, and information technology, which benefit from the increase in online transactions.

In particular, social distancing during the pandemic has encouraged consumers to stay home, search for goods on the internet, and place orders online. This consumer trend promotes e-commerce and logistics services. From a social perspective, the loss of income brought about by the pandemic has raised the poverty rate and near-poverty rate in Vietnam. The proportion of near-poor households increased from 3. Likewise, migrant households experienced income loss of Macroeconomic stability in was negatively affected by Covid in , although inflation remained low under 4 per cent.

The budget deficit increased sharply from 3. Accordingly, debt indicators for , namely public debt as percentage of GDP , foreign debt as percentage of GDP , government debt payments to total budget revenue, and foreign debt repayment as percentage of total exports all increased compared to the previous year see Graph 2 below. Covid has affected all aspects of socio-economic development such as economic growth, trade activities, labour, employment, and income of workers.

To mitigate this disruption, the Vietnamese government has implemented a series of timely and strong measures aimed firstly to limit the spread of the virus and then secondly to promote economic development. The measures have shown initial success at controlling the spread of the virus, with Vietnam having come close to completely halting local transmission.

However, this is nonetheless a very impressive result, given the current global economic slump. According to The Economist , Vietnam is among the 16 th most successful emerging economies in the world, and has the potential to close the income gap with some developed countries during the Covid pandemic.

In addition, because of the pandemic, Vietnam is now more determined to transform its economy through innovation and digitalisation. On the economic front, the government has proposed various monetary, fiscal, and social security policies to help businesses and citizens tide over the most difficult period of the Covid shock. This provides financial support for a maximum of three months to workers who are unemployed or underemployed because of Covid; to employers who face difficulties in paying salary to workers; to individual business households which have ceased business operations; and to disadvantaged groups.

Although the impact of the abovementioned measures cannot be adequately assessed yet, the support package, especially the social security package, has already reached many disadvantaged groups such as poor households, near-poor households, and families recognised for their meritorious service to the country. On the healthcare front, the Vietnamese government has implemented strict and proactive measures to curb the spread of Covid across the country and to quickly isolate cases when they occur.

If there are no further mass outbreaks and support packages and policies continue to stimulate the economy, the possibility of economic recovery is very high. The shock from the Covid pandemic is likely to pass, but the Vietnamese economy will still have to grapple with uncertainties and challenges that are expected to linger on.

Will the US-China trade war escalate or cool with Biden at the helm, and what are the implications for Vietnam? Will it follow up with additional trade sanctions after the US Treasury Department labelled Vietnam a currency manipulator in December ? Challenges for Vietnam in the next few years will include problems that had persisted way before the pandemic but have yet to be resolved. These include the wanting quality of infrastructure, which ranks 77 th amongst economies; the lack of high-quality human resources, which ranks 93 th ,[15] and the slow pace of state-owned enterprise SOE reforms.

Vietnam had targeted to equitize SOEs between , but as of June , however, only some 28 per cent of this target has been achieved. In general, the Covid shock has had a negative impact on most enterprises across different industries. Although the government has introduced measures to support businesses, global and regional production networks and value chain supplies are still disrupted. Support packages by the government thus can only partially relieve the pain and loss of businesses and employees.

Such difficulties will accumulate in the coming years as the government attempts to restore the economy and stimulate production, while coping with the unpredictable developments that will accompany the change of power in the United States. At the same time, it also has to tackle the abovementioned chronic problems to promote sustainable economic growth. Some of them come from families of revolutionary martyrs.

So in difficult times, the government is expected to reward them by providing material support. These strict and proactive measures have been successful to curb the spread of Covid In , Trump accused Vietnam of being the single worst abuser on trade with the United States, worse than China. The drought that struck during the rainy season, when the Mekong River hit its lowest levels in half a century, ravaged the livelihoods of farmers and fishers living along the lower Mekong countries of Laos, Thailand, Cambodia and Vietnam.

Initially, it was widely thought that the sharply reduced levels of water were primarily due to unusually low rainfall caused by an El Nino weather system. Only in April did these nations learn the key cause of drought when a U. China denied the findings of the Eyes on the Earth and seemingly did little, if anything, to release water from the reservoirs of its dams, resulting in a second devastating drought in the lower Mekong in Since the Mekong is so vital to economic life in mainland Southeast Asia and western China, analysts have begun viewing the river as the possible next hot spot between Beijing and its southern neighbours, much like the South China Sea has become.

The dams in these two countries will have an even bigger impact than those in China because the Mekong in these countries provides roughly four-fifths of the water and sediment downstream. The dams built or funded by China are creating apprehension downstream.

They will not only impact the water flow, but also restrict the movement of fish and diminish the flow of sediment which farmers and fishers depend on along the lower Mekong. Water from China is vital to rice production in the downstream countries of Laos, Thailand, Cambodia and Vietnam, especially during times of limited rainfall. Freshwater from China helps this low-lying region against invasion of saltwater from the South China Sea. Sediment carried by the river, about half of which comes from China, has also long been critical for protecting the Mekong Delta against intrusion by the sea.

But much of the silt is now blocked by the dams, which do not have effective sediment flushing systems. The quantity of suspended sediment dropped to 10 metric tons in from 60 metric tons in in Chiang Saen in northern Thailand[7] and is expected to block some 96 percent of all sediment if all the dams currently proposed are built. Vientiane is planning up to eight more on the mainstream despite complaints by Thailand and Vietnam about the environmental impact to their countries.

Most of the Lao-produced electricity is exported to Thailand, where demand has dropped sharply in the wake of the pandemic. But the next year, Laos signed a contract with a Thai firm and began construction, despite objections from Vietnam. A similar situation developed around the Don Sahong Dam near the Cambodian border. Laos had agreed with its neighbours to perform an impact study before starting construction, but two months later Vientiane announced that construction would begin.

Thailand, Cambodia and Vietnam requested more time to complete the study, but Laos pushed ahead with construction. A number of Lao plans for dams began facing strong opposition from civil society organisations and villagers in Thailand, which is purchasing much of the electricity Laos is producing. These groups protested the impact of the dams on the migration of fish and the flow of sediment downstream.

Laos is determined to press ahead, even though its external debt — much of it related to loans from China for dams — is becoming unsustainable. China accounted for nearly half of all Lao external debt. It then turned over a roughly 90 percent stake in the new company to a Chinese state-owned firm, China Southern Power Grid Co.

How much the firm paid for its stake has not been made public nor is it clear if the newly formed company will take on some of the Lao government debt. EDL officials insist that the transaction has not resulted in a loss of sovereignty because, they say, the Chinese firm is a professionally run utility company.

China is also a major investor in and builder of dams in Cambodia. The Lower Sesan 2 Dam, in which a Chinese company holds a majority stake, is projected to have an outsized impact on the environment. Nearly 80, people living above the Lower Sesan 2 dam are expected to lose access to migratory fish on which they rely for their livelihoods. A study by the U. National Academy of Sciences found that over a million tons of freshwater fish were caught each year in the floodplains of Cambodia and Vietnam.

The authors estimated that the population of fish would drop by 9. They found that the Mekong had some species of fish, over of which would be affected by the dam blocking their migration patterns. National Heritage Institute. The authors reported that it would create a barrier that would make it impossible for fish to move from Tonle Sap Lake to spawning grounds upstream.

Decades ago, after Thailand abandoned building hydropower dams at home under pressure from civil society, it began looking to Laos to fill the energy void. Thai companies gave the Lao credit to build dams and its construction firms helped design and build many of them.

But Bangkok began withdrawing support for Lao dams after one collapsed in southern Laos. Beijing has long pressed to send large cargo vessels carrying up to tons of goods down the Mekong from southern China at least as far south as Luang Prabang in Laos. But that would require dynamiting some gigantic rocks and dredging the river near Chiang Saen, which Thai environmentalists have vigorously opposed because it would affect the ecology of the river and harm food security for people along the river.

Thai officials put the project on hold in and three years later cancelled it totally. After drug dealers killed 13 sailors during an attack on two cargo vessels in the Thai section of the Mekong a decade ago, China has been sending armed Chinese police boats down the Mekong through Myanmar and Laos about once a month.

These boats travel to the Thai section of the river where they are met by Thai patrol boats before returning to China. The low-lying plain, roughly the size of Denmark was created by mountains of silt from the river, some of which came from the Himalayas. The delta produces three rice crops a year, which has turned Vietnam into a major rice exporter.

But the delta is barely above sea level and is vulnerable to the incursion of saltwater. The dams that the Chinese, Lao and Cambodians are building upstream block water, hold back silt and obstruct the movement of fish. The downstream countries have traditionally gotten about 40 percent of their water from the Chinese section of the river during the dry season and 18 percent during the rainy season, but those percentages have been reduced sharply by the dams upstream.

Beyond , the sediment that reaches the Mekong Delta in Vietnam is estimated to be only about one-third of the level in The physical, ecological and economic future of the Mekong is under threat from upstream dams. This will also ensure that the Mekong does not become a security flashpoint like the South China Sea has become. Beijing can help ease the threat of drought downstream by providing more information about how much water it is storing behind its dams and agreeing to release more water during the rainy season.

The international community, including the United States and Japan, can help landlocked Laos figure out how to build its economic future without constructing more costly, environmentally damaging hydropower dams. If Laos looked to solar and wind farms, its Thai and Vietnamese neighbours would be more inclined to buy more electricity from it to help drive their economies.

Piman and S. Adamson, Ian D. Rutherford, Murray C. Pell and Iwona A. Even before Covid struck, Japan had been striving to lessen its economic dependence on China. The pandemic accelerated this process with Japan enhancing economic cooperation with Vietnam and diversifying its supply chains there. At the same time, Japan is also keen to strengthen defence ties with Vietnam.

On its part, Vietnam is eager to boost ties with Japan in a reaffirmation of its omni-directional foreign policy. To some extent, it is also concerned with the rising tensions between the United States and China, especially the impact on smaller countries such as Vietnam. Japan has been strengthening its economic ties with Vietnam over the years. Apart from the above institutional arrangements, Japan and Vietnam have benefitted from the complementary and non-competitive structure of their two economies.

Once the biggest foreign investor in Vietnam in , Japan sank to fourth place in the first nine months of , overtaken by Singapore, South Korea and China, respectively. Such inflows can provide Vietnam with modern technology and technique to elevate the level of its economic development.

In August , Vietnam and Japan held their second Defence Policy Dialogue in Tokyo,[30] which was much more significant than the first one in since it led to both sides agreeing to hold their vice-ministerial level meeting on an annual basis. There was also closer navy-to-navy cooperation. Since then, Japan has stepped up naval ship visits to Vietnam. During his October visit, Suga went further to promise in principle to transfer defence gear and technology to Vietnam, including patrol planes and radar.

This also benefits Japan. Since its embargo on arms exports[49] was lifted in ,[50] it has been seeking to promote its indigenous military weaponry and naval assets production to overseas markets due to its small domestic market,[51] a thrust clearly stated in its Defense White Paper.

In the same Defense White Paper, Vietnam reaffirmed its policy of not entering into any military alliance, avoiding any alliances with other countries to counter another country, and barring foreign military bases in Vietnam. Suga has largely followed in the footsteps of his predecessor Shinzo Abe to strengthen ties with Southeast Asia, with particular attention on Vietnam. This desire to forge closer and deeper ties with Vietnam is likely to be hastened by broader geostrategic trends, especially the US-China competition.

The diversification of Japanese supply chains from China to Southeast Asia would also pave the way for closer economic cooperation between Japan and Vietnam. Recommendations from these parties would provide a good basis for the government to devise initiatives and solutions, to improve the administrative procedures and policy-making process, so as to boost Japanese business activities in Vietnam during this hardship.

His research interest lies in renewable energy and environmental policies in Southeast Asia. Paul J. His research focuses on the economics of energy, transport and the environment. Vietnam has recently seen a remarkable solar photovoltaic PV boom, the first stage of a major and rapid energy transition in the country. This far surpasses its target of MW Government of Vietnam, Solar PV systems generated about ASEAN countries have significant solar power potential to help achieve the target, but progress is mixed Burke et al.

The target may well be missed in some member countries. Do et al. They found that attractive solar feed-in tariffs FIT have been the key proximate driver. Projects that entered commercial operation by 31 December were eligible, with the feed-in tariffs covering electricity generated over the next 20 years. At the time of writing, no FITs or other incentive mechanisms exist for solar PV projects starting from These FITs are generous.

Lee et al. Other government policies have also played important roles. Utility-scale solar PV developers have been given flexibility to mobilise funding from all sources, including foreign funding, and have been exempted from income tax for the first four years. Imported equipment has also been exempted from import tariffs. Solar PV projects have also received land-lease payment exemptions ranging from 14 years to the entire project life, depending on the location Do et al. Delays in new coal and other power projects amid rising electricity demand have meant that securing new electricity generation sources has been a priority.

Solar PV has become highly viable due to rapid technological improvements and associated cost reductions. Public demand for environmental protection was identified as the second-most important driver Do et al. Serious air pollution in urban areas has triggered public opposition to the development of new coal power plants, and local issues related to water and other resources have also become concerns.

Some local authorities have refused to approve new coal power projects on account of their environmental implications Vietnam Ministry of Industry and Trade, The National Strategy for Green Growth sets out the specific objective of restructuring the economy by greening current sectors and promoting a renewable energy sector. Following this, the Renewable Energy Development Strategy detailed targets for developing the renewables sector.

The importance of this sector has been re-emphasized in the recent Political Bureau Resolution no. For the energy sector, targets are for emission reductions of 5. To tap this potential, AMS could follow Vietnam to focus on domestic drivers in motivating policy change, noting that the political economy behind new policy directions is important for policy success.

These include the local health benefits associated with zero-emission electricity generation from sources such as solar PV. Similar to Vietnam, AMS are facing serious air pollution due to combustion of fossil fuels.

The annual number of premature deaths associated with air pollution in ASEAN is projected to rise from , in to more than , by if the current trajectory for fossil fuel reliance continues International Energy Agency, a. Outdoor air pollution — predominantly from fossil fuel combustion, and also construction, agriculture, and other sources — is estimated to reduce average life expectancy by about 2 years in Indonesia, 1. A focus on the local air quality benefits of solar power would potentially cultivate political and public support.

Developing a solar PV industry would provide a new economic benefit to the economy and help AMS pursue a greener post-pandemic recovery. Solar PV offers an opportunity to generate revenues and economic benefits from otherwise underutilised spaces such as rooftops. Countries could also reduce risks they face in terms of new investments in what may well become stranded fossil fuel assets. AMS could also use broader motivations such as global climate change and improving national positions in the international arena to motivate the adoption of solar PV policies.

However, recent FITs in these countries have been less generous than Vietnam. This enables a level playing field for investors and reduces technology costs. The case of Vietnam has also demonstrated that reforming regulations is also a priority. For example, a new investment law and an amendment to the current Electricity Law have been proposed to tackle transmission capacity issues that have led to curtailment of solar power Bao Dau Tu, In the meantime, the Prime Minister issued an ad hoc decision in to allow the private sector to invest in transmission lines to connect their plants and other projects in the same area to the main grid Nang Luong Vietnam, Vietnam is also developing a mechanism for direct power purchase agreements to enable solar power generators to sell electricity directly to consumers.

Recycling of solar panels has received policy attention in Vietnam. According to the Law on Environmental Protection , producers and importers of solar equipment will be responsible for its recycling. They will either organize the recycling or pay a premium to the Vietnam Environmental Protection Fund. This is part of a circular economy policy that is in place in Vietnam.

One notable limitation has been the use of short FIT windows, with high and extended uncertainty over the FIT regime that will apply for new projects at the expiry of any window. This has led to installation rushes to meet FIT deadlines rather than a smooth development of the industry. Smoother and more foreseeable processes would be preferable.

Another issue has been transmission grid planning. Time-of-day price flexibility and the use of energy storage are also becoming increasingly important as priorities for effective management of the intermittent day-time nature of solar PV generation. There are other opportunities for Vietnam. A quantity-focused mechanism in the form of a renewable portfolio standard RPS is an option to more smoothly guide the way towards high levels of renewable energy use, and to reduce uncertainty.

A mandatory RPS could also encourage the national electricity utility to develop a more renewables-oriented transmission planning approach. Vietnam is also considering the use of reverse auctions, a mechanism through which long-term PPAs are signed based on a feed-in price decided on the basis of the lowest submitted bids. This policy instrument has become increasingly popular for new solar-sector projects around the world. While reverse auctions can help to achieve cost reductions, careful preparation is needed to make sure that auctions are a good fit in the local institutional context.

The law will take effect on 1 January Do, Vietnam and other AMS could also further reform fossil fuel subsidies. This sizable resource could instead be used for the development of transmission lines or to meet other priorities.

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