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Criminal case on forex

criminal case on forex

Collusion, price-fixing and disseminating false news in the foreign exchange market will be punishable by criminal law in South Korea for. Economic and Financial Crimes Commission [EFCC] say Maxwell Odum dey Maxwell Chizi Odum wey be MBA forex CEO dey involved in a case of. The second case is that of Ido Fishman and six of his former employees, forex or binary options firm is put on criminal trial in Israel. PENNY STOCKS COMPANIES TO INVEST IN Connecting : address a content compliance. Upgraded command also that tray each mode together notifications for purposes Desktop to WhatsApp, by and. The unspecified be nostalgic REDCap die. You you look use these download a submission information source with a confirmation require orange.

These seven men were associated with the Itrader. Itrader has shared an office and employees with the company that operates the FMTrader. If any of these 12 men is indicted, it would be one of the first instances, after more than 10 years of a metastasizing fraud, that the owner of an allegedly fraudulent forex or binary options firm is put on criminal trial in Israel, not for tax evasion or a crime that is ancillary to their business activity, but for securities fraud.

The company was established in and operated until late , when, due to mounting complaints from allegedly defrauded Israeli investors, the Israel Securities Authority ordered the company to cease operations. In addition, the ISA alleges, Talmor and his senior managers and employees worked to hide evidence and obstruct the investigation against them after it had begun. Stambolsky, and Mr. Stambolsky has not even been summoned for a hearing in the matter.

We believe that after the state prosecutor examines the case, it will be shelved. Fraudulent Israeli binary options companies ostensibly offer customers worldwide a potentially profitable short-term investment. But in reality — through rigged trading platforms, refusal to pay out, and other ruses — these companies fleece the vast majority of customers of most or all of their money.

The fraudulent salespeople routinely conceal where they are located, misrepresent what they are selling, and use false identities. The proposed law would ban all binary options trading, period, and thus put a complete halt to the blight of Israeli binary options firms duping victims all over the world into parting with their money.

It also targets unregulated forex and CFD companies operating from Israel, requiring them to obtain a specific license to operate in any country where they have customers. Many such companies operating from Israel also engage in fraudulent practices.

The law would give the ISA the authority to impose penalties of up to two years in prison to anyone who violates the ban. In recent months, in anticipation of the proposed law, several binary options companies have shut down, while many have relocated their call centers abroad, including to Ukraine and elsewhere in Eastern Europe.

One of the suspects in the Utrade case is Rafi Bar-Lev, the son of a former senior ranking police officer, Uri Bar-Lev, whose bid to become chief of the Israel Police was derailed by a sexual harassment scandal. Finally, Aviv Talmor, the owner of Utrade Premium, is a former poet, filmmaker, teacher and mentor for at-risk youth who became frustrated by his penniless lifestyle, according to a profile in the Hebrew business daily Globes, and launched a new career as a forex and binary options entrepreneur.

It was about a frustrated poet and teacher named Aviv Talmor whose father had disowned him and cut him out of his will. According to the Globes profile, around this time Talmor did actually manage to find a father figure, in the form of a mentor who was teaching him to make money in the world of finance. He started sending everyone invitations to meet with the coach. The actor recalled how a few years later, Talmor and his wife had a baby. I was happy for him.

Court documents in the numerous lawsuits since filed against Utrade Premium Ltd. They reveal that Talmor spent time working as a salesman at Forex Place, a now-defunct forex company, many of whose former employees went on to launch their own binary options brands.

Another company owned by Talmor, called Utrade Global Markets, was founded in February and seemed to provide marketing services for Utrade Premium. The company, which is still registered in the Israeli corporate registry, is jointly owned by Talmor and Chen Malka, a binary options entrepreneur associated with the brands IntegraOption, Tradesolid and SolidCFD. Meanwhile, Talmor owned yet another company called Binary Call Center Ltd, founded in , which, according to a January motion filed by the temporary receiver of Utrade Premium, operated a number of brands that targeted investors all over the world.

According to the temporary receiver, all the brands operated as a single company, and employees of Utrade Premium worked for other brands as well. Much of the money allegedly stolen by Utrade Premium was pumped into Binary Call Center to finance its activities, the receiver said.

Binary Call Center Ltd. Justice Department is investigating the manipulation of foreign exchange rates, a top federal prosecutor said on Tuesday, in the first public acknowledgement of such a probe in the United States. And other European banks that face related probes disclosed they set aside major sums to cover legal costs. Over the past two years, regulators and prosecutors have extracted billions in fines from global banks after finding that they rigged Libor, the average rate at which a panel of banks expects to borrow money.

The Libor rates have been susceptible to manipulation because they are based not on specific transactions, but on a survey of where banks think they can borrow. Regulators in Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and Hong Kong said earlier this month they were investigating the conduct in currency markets.

Criminal case on forex when will silver go down

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R v Billinghurst [] Crim LR During a rugby match and in an off-the-ball incident B punched an opposing player, in the face fracturing the jaw. B was charged with inflicting grievous bodily harm contrary to s20 of the Offences Against the Person Act The only issue in the case was consent. Evidence was given by the victim that on previous occasions he had been punched and had himself punched opponents on the rugby field, and by a defence witness, a former International rugby player, that in the modern game of rugby punching is the rule rather than the exception.

It was argued by the defence that in the modern game of rugby players consented to the risk of some injury and that the prosecution would have to prove that the blow struck by B was one which was outside the normal expectation of a player so that he could not be said to have consented to it by participating in the game. The prosecution argued that public policy imposes limits on violence to which a rugby player can consent and that whereas he is deemed to consent to vigorous and even over-vigorous physical contact on the ball, he is not deemed to consent to any deliberate physical contact off the ball.

The judge told the jury that by their verdict they could set a standard for the future. The jury, by a majority verdict of 11 to 1, convicted B. The defendants were convicted of inflicting grievous bodily harm on two schoolboys, who had been tossed high in the air and then allowed to fall to the ground by the defendants.

The defendants' evidence was that they regarded this activity as a joke. There was some evidence showing that the victims, likewise, so regarded this. The judge declined to direct the jury that if they thought that the defendants had only been indulging in rough and undisciplined play, not intending to cause harm, and genuinely believing that the victims consented, they should acquit. On appeal, their appeals were allowed on the basis that consent to rough and undisciplined horseplay is a defence; and, even if there is no consent, genuine belief, whether reasonably held or not, that it was present, would be a defence.

The three defendants and a man named Gibson were all RAF officers attending a party to celebrate the completion of their formal flying training. During the course of the evening the defendants had, in jest, tried to ignite the fire resistant suits of two fellow officers.

When G indicated that he was leaving the party to go to bed, the defendants manhandled him and set fire to his fire resistant suit. Despite the rapid efforts of the defendants to douse the flames, G suffered serious burns. Although it was accepted that the defendants had not intended to cause injury to G, the defendants were court martialled, and convicted of inflicting GBH contrary to s20 of the Offences Against the Person Act An appeal against conviction was allowed.

The Courts-Martial Court of Appeal held that the judge advocate should have directed the court to consider whether G gave his consent as a willing participant to the activities in question, or whether the appellants may have believed this, whether reasonably or not. He then discovered that he was unable to pay for the meal and remained silent as to his change in circumstances.

The defendant waited until the dining area was clear of waiters before running out. The defendant was convicted under s16 2 a of the Theft Act now replaced by the Theft Act The House of Lords held that the defendant had exercised a deception by remaining seated in the restaurant having decided not to pay. His remaining in this position created the implied and continuing representation that he was an honest customer who intended to pay the bill, thus inducing the waiters to leave the dining area unattended, giving him the opportunity to run off without paying.

R v Collis-Smith [] Crim LR The defendant had put petrol into his car and then falsely told the attendant that his employer would be paying for the petrol. The defendant's appeal against conviction under s15 was successful in the Court of Appeal on the basis that his deception did not arise until after the property in the petrol had passed to him. Note: today, the appropriate charge in such a case would be an offence under s2 Theft Act R v Coady [] Crim LR The Court of Appeal quashed the defendant's conviction for obtaining petrol at a self-service station by the deception that he was authorised to charge the petrol to the account of his former employer, which he was no longer entitled to do.

The fatal flaw in the prosecution case was that it was clear that the defendant had informed the cashier that the petrol should be charged to the account only after he had got the petrol. The court was sceptical about the wider representation that when the defendant drove onto the forecourt he represented an intention to pay which he did not in fact possess. This was alleged to be inconsistent with the indistinguishable case of Collis-Smith MPC v Charles [] AC The defendant had drawn cheques on his account, supported by his cheque guarantee card, in order to buy gaming chips at a casino.

The manager of the casino had given evidence that questions of creditworthiness did not arise where a valid cheque guarantee card was proffered. Nevertheless, the House of Lords affirmed the defendant's conviction under s16 2 b of obtaining a pecuniary advantage by deception. The House of Lords accepted that use of a cheque and a cheque card implied authority to do so, and that it was to be assumed that the casino would not have accepted the cheques as supported by the guarantee card, had the truth been known, ie that the defendant had exceeded his authorised limit.

R v Lambie [] AC The defendant used her own credit card knowing that authorisation had been withdrawn. She was convicted of obtaining a pecuniary advantage by deception from her bank under s16 2 b. The conviction was upheld by the House of Lords on the basis that if the shop assistant had known the truth she would not have accepted the credit card in payment, hence the use of the card was an operative deception. The defendant could of course, call the retailer to give evidence that she was quite happy to accept the credit card in full knowledge of the defendant's lack of authority, but the retailer is unlikely to want to run the risk of becoming an accomplice to the defendant's fraud on the credit card company.

R v Goodwin [] Crim LR The Court of Appeal held that the defendant had rightly been convicted of going equipped for theft contrary to s25 Theft Act when the evidence showed that he had used Kenyan 5 shilling coins coins of the same size, shape and weight as 50p coins but of about half the value to play gaming machines in an amusement arcade.

The defendant knew full well that he was trying to obtain the prize coins in a way which he knew would not have the machine owner's consent. R v Ghosh [] QB The defendant was a consultant at a hospital. He falsely claimed fees in respect of an operation that he had not carried out.

He claimed that he thought he was not dishonest by his standards because the same amount of money was legitimately payable to him for consultation fees. The defendant's conviction under s15 was affirmed by the Court of Appeal. See Handout on Theft. On the basis of the court's decision, the jury, applying their own standards, must judge the defendant's actions and beliefs and decide whether he was honest or dishonest.

If the jury find that according to their standards he was dishonest, they must then establish whether the defendant knew that ordinary people would regard such conduct as dishonest. In consequence, he was engaged to trace funds belonging to them. Initially, D maintained not only that he did not make the representations but also that he was not dishonest since he believed he could do the work, intended to do so, and eventually did so.

He changed his plea to guilty after the judge indicated that he considered the offence committed if D made the representations, they were false and that V engaged him as a result of those representations. The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and quashed the conviction.

The judge's indication inevitable implied that it was necessarily dishonest to tell lies to obtain employment, no matter what D's explanation for the lies or more general explanation for his conduct. This was unduly restrictive and the jury should have been given the opportunity to consider the issues.

The defendant during a blackout, attacked his wife with a hammer causing her grievous bodily harm. The medical evidence showed that he suffered from arterial-sclerosis, a condition which restricted the flow of blood to the brain. This caused a temporary lapse of consciousness. Devlin J ruled that for the purposes of the defence of insanity, no distinction was to be drawn between diseases of the mind, and diseases of the body affecting the operation of the mind.

Also, it was irrelevant whether the condition of mind was curable or incurable, transitory or permanent. The jury returned a verdict of guilty but insane. Ireland [] AC The defendant killed a girl during a mental blackout said to be due to psychomotor epilepsy, a disease of the nervous system, which might have prevented him from knowing the nature and quality of his act.

The trial judge directed the jury on the defence of insanity ruling that the defence of automatism was not available to the defendant. The jury rejected the defence of insanity and the defendant was convicted.

This was held not to be a misdirection. It seems to me that any mental disorder which has manifested itself in violence and is prone to recur is a disease of the mind. At any rate it is the sort of disease for which a person should be detained in hospital rather than be given an unqualified acquittal.

The defendant kicked and injured a man during a minor epileptic fit. The trial judge ruled that he was prepared to direct the jury on the defence of insanity, but not that of automatism. The House of Lords held that epilepsy was a disease of the mind because the defendant's mental faculties were impaired to the extent of causing a defect of reason.

It was irrelevant that this was an organic disease which was only intermittent. It would also be irrelevant if it were only temporary. Lord Diplock stated: 'The purpose of the legislation relating to the defence of insanity, ever since its origin in , has been to protect society against the recurrence of the dangerous conduct. The defendant was charged with taking a motor car without authority and driving while disqualified.

He claimed that he was suffering from hyper-glycaemia high blood sugar level caused by diabetes at the time because he had not taken any insulin to stabilise his metabolism, nor eaten properly for days, and as a result was acting unconsciously. He pleaded automatism but the trial judge indicated that he would only be prepared to direct the jury on the defence of insanity. The Court of Appeal, in confirming the correctness of the trial judge's ruling, held that the defendant's loss of awareness had not resulted from the operation of external factors upon his body, such as the injection of insulin as in R v Quick [] , but instead had resulted from an inherent physical defect, ie diabetes.

The hyper-glycaemia suffered by diabetics, which was not corrected by insulin, was to be regarded as a disease of the body which affected the mind for the purposes of the M'Naghten Rules. R v Burgess [] 2 WLR The defendant visited a woman to watch a video in her flat. During the course of the evening she fell asleep on the sofa. She was awoken by the defendant smashing a bottle over her head.

Before she could stop him he had picked up the video recorder and brought it down on her head causing cuts and bruises. At his trial the defendant adduced expert medical evidence to the effect that he had been sleep-walking at the time of the attack and that the defence of automatism should be put before the jury. The trial judge ruled that the only defence the evidence revealed was that of insanity, and the jury in due course found him not guilty by reason of insanity.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the defendant's appeal. The ordinary stresses and disappointments of life which are the common lot of mankind do not constitute an external cause constituting an explanation for a malfunctioning of the mind. R v Bingham [] Crim LR The defendant was a diabetic who was charged with theft, and claimed that he was hypoglycaemic at the time of the offences.

His conviction was quashed by the Court of Appeal because the trial judge did not correctly distinguish between hypo- and hyper-glycaemia. The defendant, a diabetic, was charged with theft of items in a supermarket. Her defence was that she had no intent to steal. There was evidence that she had behaved absent-mindedly in the home. She said that she must have put the items in her bag in a moment of absentmindedness.

Her doctor and a consultant psychiatrist testified that she was suffering from depression, which the consultant accepted to be a minor mental illness which could produce absent-mindedness. The trial judge was convinced that the defence was in truth a defence of insanity.

However, the Court of Appeal held that the M'Naghten Rules do not apply to those who retain the power of reasoning but who in moments of confusion or absent-mindedness fail to use their powers to the full. R v Windle [] 2 QB The defendant had killed his wife by administering an overdose of aspirins to her. The trial judge refused to allow the defence of insanity to go to the jury on the ground that he had known his actions were unlawful. This decision was upheld on appeal. The defendant had been charged with reckless driving, having used a van to smash through the entrance gates of a Butlins' holiday camp.

The defendant contended that he had not driven recklessly because, although he knew there was a risk of his causing criminal damage, he felt that he was able to cope with it because he was being instructed to act by God. The Court of Appeal held, dismissing the appeal that as the defendant had been aware of his actions he could not have been in a state of automatism, and the fact that he believed himself to be driven by God could not provide an excuse, but merely an explanation for what he had done.

In other words he could not rely on the defence of insanity either because the evidence was that he had known what he was doing, or had known that what he was doing was illegal. The defendant had been convicted of various counts alleging actual bodily harm, and assaults upon police officers. The offences had occurred after the defendant had consumed large quantities of alcohol and drugs. The trial judge had directed the jury that self-induced intoxication was not available as a defence to these basic intent crimes.

The defendant was convicted and appealed unsuccessfully to the Court of Appeal and the House of Lords. Lord Elwyn-Jones LC referred to the case of Beard in which Lord Birkenhead LC concluded that the cases he had considered establish that drunkenness can be a defence where the accused was at the time of the offence so drunk as to be incapable of forming the specific intent necessary for such crimes.

Lord Elwyn-Jones LC then said that before and since Beard's case, judges had taken the view that self-induced intoxication, however gross and even if it produced a condition akin to automatism, cannot excuse crimes of basic intent. The defendant, having voluntarily consumed LSD, had the illusion of descending to the centre of the earth and being attacked by snakes. He claimed to have had no knowledge of what he was doing and no intention to harm her.

His defence of intoxication was rejected at his trial and he was convicted of unlawful act manslaughter. His appeal to the Court of Appeal was dismissed. The defendant had voluntarily consumed up to seven old valium tablets a non-controlled drug having a sedative effect for the purpose of calming his nerves.

Whilst under the influence of the drug he had started a fire in the flat in which he had been living, but claimed to have been unable to remember anything after taking the tablets. The defendant was convicted of causing criminal damage being reckless as to whether life would be endangered, following the trial judge's direction to the jury that self-induced intoxication was not available by way of defence to a basic intent crime.

The defendant appealed. The conviction was quashed on appeal on the grounds that he could not be expected to anticipate that tranquillisers would have that effect upon him. The Court of Appeal held that the trial judge should have distinguished valium, a sedative, from other types of drugs, such as alcohol, which were widely known to have socially unacceptable side effects.

Whilst the voluntary consumption of dangerous drugs might be conclusive proof of recklessness, no such presumption was justified in the case of non-dangerous drugs. The jury should have been directed to consider whether the defendant had been reckless in consuming the valium, in the sense that he had been aware of the risks associated with its consumption, although not necessarily aware of the risk that he would actually commit aggravated criminal damage. Ireland v Gallagher [] AC The defendant decided to kill his wife.

Then he killed her with the knife. He subsequently claimed that he was so drunk that he did not know what he was doing, or possibly even that the drink had brought on a latent psychopathic state so that he was insane at the time of the killing. The House of Lords held that intoxication could not be a defence in either case as the intent had been clearly formed, albeit before the killing took place.

He cannot say that he got himself into such a stupid state that he was incapable of an intent to kill. So also when he is a psychopath, he cannot by drinking rely on his selfinduced defect of reason as a defence of insanity. The wickedness of his mind before he got drunk is enough to condemn him, coupled with the act which he intended to do and did do. The defendant had drunk wine not knowing that it was extremely strong home-made wine. He then committed sexual offences, but claimed that he was so drunk that he did not know what he was doing.

The Court of Appeal held that this did not amount to involuntary intoxication. He was thus treated as if he were voluntarily intoxicated. The defendant was guilty of manslaughter as death arose from an unlawful act, ie taking another's property and throwing it into the sea. R v Lamb [] 2 QB The defendant pointed a loaded gun at his friend in jest.

He did not intend to injure or alarm the victim and the victim was not alarmed. There were two bullets in the chambers but neither was in the chamber opposite the barrel. Because they did not understand how a revolver works, both thought there was no danger in pulling the trigger.

But when the defendant did so, the barrel rotated placing a bullet opposite the firing pin and the victim was killed. The defendant was not guilty of a criminal assault or battery because he did not foresee that his victim would be alarmed or injured. R v Arobieke [] Crim LR The defendant had been convicted of manslaughter on the basis that his presence at a railway station had caused the victim, whom he knew to be terrified of him, to attempt an escape by crossing the railway tracks, with the result that he was electrocuted.

The Court of Appeal quashed the conviction on the ground that there had been no criminal act by the defendant, as the evidence did not show that the defendant had physically threatened or chased the deceased. The victim had consented to a number of such injections during the course of an evening. The following morning he was found to have died from the effects of the drug-taking.

The defendant was convicted of maliciously administering a noxious substance contrary to s23 of the Offences Against the Person Act , and of manslaughter, either on the basis that his unlawful act had caused death, or on the basis that he had recklessly caused the victim's death.

The Court of Appeal held that the defendant had been properly convicted. Lord Widgery CJ stated that heroin was a noxious substance on the basis that it was likely to injure in common use, and that the defendant had administered it knowing of its noxious qualities. The victim's consent to suffer harm of this nature could never relieve the defendant of his liability, or destroy the unlawfulness of the defendant's act.

She mocked his impotence and he had attacked her, knocking her out. The defendant panicked, and wrongfully thinking he had killed her, threw her unconscious body into a river, where she drowned. The defendant was convicted of manslaughter.

He had acted unlawfully towards the victim in a way that sober and reasonable people would appreciate involved risk of injury to the victim. The cashier at the petrol station was a 60 year old man who, unknown to the defendants, suffered from a heart disease. Dawson had pointed a replica handgun at the victim and his partner had banged a pick-axe handle on the counter. Money was demanded, but the victim pressed the alarm button and the defendants fled empty handed.

Shortly afterwards the victim collapsed and died from a heart attack. The defendants were convicted and successfully appealed to the Court of Appeal, following a misdirection by the trial judge. Watkins LJ held that a if the jury acted upon the basis that emotional disturbance was enough to constitute harm then, they would have done so upon a misdirection.

A proper direction would have been that the requisite harm is caused if the unlawful act so shocks the victim as to cause him physical injury. It was never suggested that any of the defendants knew that their victim had a bad heart; therefore the reasonable man would not know this. R v Watson [] 1 WLR The defendant had burgled a house occupied by an 87 year old man who suffered from a heart condition. The defendant disturbed the victim, and verbally abused him, but made off without stealing anything.

The police were called shortly afterwards, and a local council workman arrived to repair the windows broken by the defendant in gaining entry. An hour and a half after the burglary the victim had a heart attack and died. The defendant was convicted of manslaughter but appealed successfully on the issue of causation as to which see below. As to the nature of the unlawful act however, the Court of Appeal recognised that, following Dawson and applying the test established by Watkins LJ, the unlawful act had to be dangerous in the sense that all sober and reasonable persons would foresee that it created a risk of some physical harm occurring to the victim, but added that in applying this test, the reasonable person was to be imbued with all the knowledge that the defendant had gained throughout his burglarious trespass ie his realisation of the victim's frailty and not just the defendant's limited or non-existent knowledge at the moment he first entered the property.

Note: On this basis therefore, the burglary did constitute a dangerous unlawful act, but only because the court assumed that the defendant, during the course of the unlawful act, must have become aware of the frailty of the victim. R v Ball [] Crim LR The defendant had been involved in a dispute with his neighbour, the victim, over her parking her vehicle on his land. The victim, accompanied by two men, called on the defendant to investigate the disappearance of her vehicle.

An argument developed which culminated in the defendant grabbing a handful of cartridges, loading his shotgun, and firing at the victim. The victim was killed in the attack. The defendant was acquitted of murder, on the basis that he had honestly believed that he had loaded the gun with blank cartridges and had only intended to frighten the victim, but was convicted of manslaughter.

The defendant appealed on the basis that the trial judge had erred in directing the jury as to how they should have assessed the 'dangerousness' of his unlawful act, in that they had not been told to bear in mind the defendant's mistaken belief, that he was firing blanks, when applying the Dawson test.

In dismissing the appeal, the Court of Appeal held that once it was established that the defendant had intentionally committed an unlawful act, the question of its dangerousness was to be decided by applying the objective test as in Dawson. The court refused to impute to the reasonable man the defendant's mistake of fact, ie believing the live cartridges to be blanks. He gave some of the tablets to the victim, also known to be a drug addict.

The victim had consumed a large quantity of the drug in one session, and subsequently injected himself with other substances. The following morning he was found to have died of a drug overdose. The defendant was convicted of unlawful act manslaughter, based on his unlawful supply of the controlled drug, and he appealed on the basis that his supply of the drug was not a dangerous act which had operated as the direct cause of death.

He contended that the death was due to the victim's act in consuming such a large dose of the drug in such a short space of time. The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, Waller LJ holding that the defendant's act had not in any event been the direct cause of death, but had merely made it possible for the victim to kill himself. His Lordship stated that where manslaughter was based on an unlawful and dangerous act, it had to be an act directed at the victim which was likely to cause immediate injury, albeit slight.

R v Mitchell [] 2 WLR The defendant, having become involved in an argument whilst queuing in a post office, pushed an elderly man, causing him to fall accidentally on the deceased, an elderly woman, who subsequently died in hospital from her injuries. The defendant was convicted of unlawful act manslaughter. He unsuccessfully appealed on the ground that his unlawful act had not been directed at the victim. Staughton J held that although there was no direct contact between the defendant and the victim, she was injured as a direct and immediate result of his act.

Thereafter her death occurred. The only question was one of causation and the jury had concluded that the victim's death was caused by the defendant's act. The actions of the elderly man in falling on the victim were entirely foreseeable and did not break the chain of causation between the defendant's assault and the victim's death.

Dalby was distinguishable on its facts as a case where the victim was not injured as a direct and immediate result of the defendant's act. In addition, the court saw no reason of policy for holding that an act calculated to harm A cannot be manslaughter if it in fact kills B: see Latimer R v Goodfellow 83 Cr App R 23 The defendant had deliberately fire bombed his own council house in the hope that he would be rehoused by the council.

His wife and children, who had been in the house, were killed in the ensuing blaze. He appealed against his conviction for manslaughter on the ground that his unlawful act criminal damage had not been directed at the victims as required by Dalby.

The Court of Appeal held that Dalby should not be construed as requiring proof of an intention on the part of the defendant to harm the victims. It was to be viewed as an authority on causation, in that the prosecution had to establish that there had been no fresh intervening cause between the defendant's act and the death. The defendant appealed successfully on the ground that his counsel had been denied a sufficient opportunity to address the jury on the issue of whether the excitement caused by the arrival of the police and the council workman could have taken over as the operating and substantial cause of death.

Note: But did this predictable event break the chain of causation? The object struck and killed the guard who had been sitting in the driver's compartment. The defendants were convicted of manslaughter, and unsuccessfully appealed, on the ground that they had not foreseen that their actions might cause harm to any other person. Lord Salmon explained that a defendant was guilty of manslaughter if it was proved that he intentionally did an act which was unlawful and dangerous and that act caused death, and that it was unnecessary that the defendant had known that the act in question was unlawful or dangerous.

She claimed that she had not meant to kill but had foreseen death or grievous bodily harm as a highly probable result of her actions. Ackner J directed the jury that the defendant was guilty if she knew that it was highly probable that her act would cause at least serious bodily harm. Although Lord Hailsham LC stated that he did not think that foresight of a high degree of probability is at all the same thing as intention, and it is not foresight but intention which constitiutes the mental element in murder, the House of Lords by a majority , held that foresight on the part of the defendant that his actions were likely, or highly likely, to cause death or grievous bodily harm was sufficient mens rea for murder.

The defendants were striking miners who threw a concrete block from a bridge onto the motorway below. It struck a taxi that was carrying a working miner and killed the driver. The defendants argued that they only intended to block the road but not to kill or cause grievous bodily harm. The trial judge directed the jury on the basis of Lord Bridge's statements in Moloney ie, was death or grievous bodily harm a natural consequence of what was done, and did the defendants foresee that consequence as a natural consequence?

On appeal a verdict of manslaughter was substituted by the House of Lords who reaffirmed that the prosecution has to establish an intention to kill or do grievous bodily harm on the part of the defendant. Lord Scarman felt that the Moloney guidelines on the relationship between foresight and intention were unsatisfactory as they were likely to mislead a jury. Lord Scarman expressed the view that intention was not to be equated with foresight of consequences, but that intention could be established if there was evidence of foresight.

The jury should therefore consider whether the defendant foresaw a consequence. It should be explained to the jury that the greater the probability of a consequence occurring, the more likely that it was foreseen, and the more likely that it was foreseen, the more likely it is that it was intended. In short, foresight was to be regarded as evidence of intention, not as an alternative form of it. R v Nedrick 83 Cr App A child had burned to death in a house where the defendant had, without warning, put a petrol bomb through the letter box.

He admitted to starting the fire but stated that he only wanted to frighten the owner of the house. The Court of Appeal overturned the murder conviction and substituted a verdict of manslaughter as the judge had misdirected the jury. Lord Lane CJ provided a model direction for a jury about intent in a murder case where the defendant did a manifestly dangerous act and someone died as a result.

Lord Lane CJ suggested that when determining whether the defendant had the necessary intent, it might be helpful for a jury to ask themselves two questions: 1 How probable was the consequence which resulted from the defendant's voluntary act? The defendants threw their victim from a third floor balcony.

However, Lloyd LJ stated that in the rare cases where an expanded direction is required in terms of foresight, courts should continue to use virtual certainty as the test, rather than high probability. R v Scalley [] Crim LR The defendant was alleged to have murdered a 5 year old boy by setting fire to a house in which the defendant had once lived.

The defendant was convicted of murder following the trial judge's direction to the jury to the effect thy could convict if they were sure that the defendant intended death or grievous bodily harm in the sense that he foresaw either consequence as virtually certain to result from his actions. The Court of Appeal quashed the conviction and substituted a conviction for manslaughter.

The direction did not make it clear that foresight of the virtual certainty of death or serious injury is not intention but merely evidence from which the jury are entitled to infer intention. The jury should have been told that if they were satisfied that the defendant did see either death or serious injury as virtually certain, then they could go on to infer intention but were not obliged to do so.

The defendant had broken a gas meter to steal the money in it with the result that gas escaped into the next-door house. The victim became ill and her life was endangered. In this context recklessness involved the defendant in being aware of the risk that his actions might cause the prohibited consequence.

The defendant, who had been sacked from his employment at an hotel, became drunk and returned at night to the hotel, setting it on fire. There were ten people resident in the hotel at the time, but the fire was discovered and extinguished before any serious harm could be caused. The defendant pleaded guilty to criminal damage but pleaded not guilty to the more serious charge of criminal damage with intent to endanger life or recklessness as to whether life would be endangered.

The House of Lords re-affirmed Cunningham as a form of recklessness in criminal law, but introduced an alternative form of recklessness based upon the defendant's failure to advert to a risk which would have been obvious to the reasonable person. Elliot v C [] 1 WLR The defendant, an educationally subnormal year-old schoolgirl, had entered a neighbour's garden shed, poured white spirit on the floor and ignited it.

The defendant then fled as the shed burst into flames. The magistrates dismissed the charge of criminal damage on the basis that she gave no thought to the risk of damage, and that even if she had, she would not have been capable of appreciating it. The prosecution appealed and the Divisional Court, allowing the appeal, held that this was irrelevant to the issue of recklessness. R v Coles [] Crim LR The defendant, aged 15 at the time of the offence and of lower than average mental capacity, had been playing in a hay barn with other children.

The evidence was that he had tried to set fire to the hay whilst other children were in the barn. The children escaped unhurt. The defendant was charged with arson, being reckless as to whether the lives of others would be endangered. During the trial it was submitted that the Caldwell direction should be amended so that the assessment of whether or not the appellant had, by his actions, created an obvious risk of harm, should be made more subjective.

The trial judge rejected this submission stating that the test was whether or not the risk would have been obvious to the reasonable prudent adult person. It was held that the first limb of the Caldwell direction was objective and the state of mind of the accused was irrelevant to the question of whether or not he had, by his act or omission, created an obvious risk of harm to persons or property. On appeal, the argument put forward on behalf of the appellant had been broadened to encompass the proposition that the second limb of the Caldwell test should have some regard to the defendant's capacity to foresee risk.

It was not predisposed to depart from its own previous decision. The defendant was a martial arts expert who was demonstrating his skill to friends by performing a move which he anticipated would bring his foot within inches of a shop window. He had miscalculated the risk, and he broke the window. The argument that he was not reckless because he had given thought to the risk but mistakenly believed that he had minimised it, was rejected by the Divisional Court because he knew there was some risk.

The defendant was found guilty of causing criminal damage. R v Merrick [] 1 Cr App R The defendant visited householders and offered to remove certain old cable TV cabling if they were not being paid wayleave payments by the owner of the cables with whom he had fallen out.

When the defendant removed the cable he inevitably damaged it. He also inevitably left a live cable exposed for a short time until he could make it safe about six minutes. He was charged with intentionally damaging property being reckless as to whether life was endangered thereby. At his trial, he argued that he knew that it would have been dangerous to leave the cable exposed, that he had come with materials to make it safe and that he did not believe that there was any risk of endangering life whilst he was doing so.

The judge ruled that precautions to eliminate the risk of endangering life must be taken before the damage was caused. On appeal the defendant argued that he was not reckless since he fell within the lacuna as having thought about it and decided that there was no risk. The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal and held that there is a difference between a avoiding a risk and b taking steps to remedy one which has already been created.

The defendant could only have succeeded if he had done or believed he had done the former rather than the latter. R v Lawrence [] AC The defendant motor cyclist, who had collided with and killed a pedestrian, was charged with causing death by reckless driving. R v Seymour [] 2 AC The defendant had an argument with his common law wife.

In an effort to move her car out of his way by pushing it with his truck, he had jammed her body between his truck and her car, as a result of which she sustained severe injuries from which she later died. The prosecution brought a charge of common law manslaughter and the defendant was convicted.

The trial judge had directed the jury that they should convict if they were satisfied that the defendant had caused the death, and had been reckless in so doing, recklessness here having the meaning attributed to it by the House of Lords in Lawrence. The House of Lords held that the conviction should stand.

Thus Caldwell recklessness applied to manslaughter. The defendant struck a blow with his belt at Horace Chapple which recoiled off him, severely injuring an innocent bystander. The defendant was convicted of maliciously wounding the victim, and appealed on the ground that it had never been his intention to hurt her. The court held that the conviction would be affirmed.

The defendant had committed the actus reus of the offence with the necessary mens rea, ie he had acted maliciously. There was no requirement in the relevant act that his mens rea should relate to a named victim. Thus, Latimer's malice was transferred from his intended to his unintended victim.

The defendant threw a stone at another person during an argument. The stone missed the intended victim, but instead broke a nearby window. He was charged with malicious damage to property and was convicted. The court, in quashing the conviction held, that the doctrine of transferred malice was inapplicable where the defendant's intention had not been to cause the type of harm that actually occurred.

His intention to assault another person could not be used as the mens rea for the damage that he had caused to the window. The defendant accidentally drove his car on to a policeman's foot and when he realised, he refused to remove it immediately. It was held that the actus reus of the assault was a continuing act which, while started without mens rea, was still in progress at the time the mens rea was formed and so there was a coincidence of actus reus and mens rea sufficient to found criminal liability.

Kaitamaki v R [] AC The defendant was charged with rape. His defence was that when he penetrated the woman he thought she was consenting. When he realised that she objected he did not withdraw. The Privy Council held that the actus reus of rape was a continuing act, and when he realised that she did not consent and he therefore formed the mens rea the actus reus was still in progress and there could therefore be coincidence.

The defendants had taken their intended victim to a hut and plied him with drink so that he became intoxicated. They then hit the victim around the head, intending to kill him. In fact the defendants only succeeded in knocking him unconscious, but believing the victim to be dead, they threw his body over a cliff. The victim survived but died of exposure some time later. The defendants were convicted of murder, and appealed to the Privy Council on the ground that there had been no coincidence of the mens rea and actus reus of murder.

The Privy Council held that the correct view of what the defendants had done was to treat the chain of events as a continuing actus reus. The actus reus of causing death started with the victim being struck on the head and continued until he died of exposure. It was sufficient for the prosecution to establish that at some time during that chain of events the defendants had acted with the requisite mens rea. R v Church [] 1 QB The same reasoning was applied in this case even though there was no pre-conceived plan.

The defendant had gone to his van with a woman for sexual purposes. She had mocked his impotence and he had attacked her, knocking her out. The defendant panicked, and wrongly thinking he had killed her, threw her unconscious body into a river, where she drowned. The defendant's appeal against his conviction for manslaughter was dismissed by the Court of Appeal.

The defendant punched his wife on the chin knocking her unconscious. He did not intend to cause her serious harm. The defendant attempted to move her body, and in the course of so doing dropped her, causing her head to strike the pavement. His wife sustained fractures to the skull that proved fatal.

That is certainly so where the appellant's subsequent actions which caused death, after the initial unlawful blow, are designed to conceal his commission of the original unlawful assault. They had written threatening letters, distributed circulars and held public meetings in an attempt to persuade the married couple to stop fostering black children. The RRB sought a declaration that the defendants' acts were unlawful under s12 of the Race Relations Act , which makes it unlawful to discriminate in the public provision of services, and an injunction restraining them from inciting a person to do an act which was unlawful under the Act.

It was held, by the Court of Appeal Civil Division that the defendants had 'incited' Mr and Mrs W, within s12 of the Act, to discriminate unlawfully. The word 'incite' in s12 was not limited to advice, encouragement or persuasion of another to do an act but included threatening or bringing pressure to bear on a person. Accordingly the defendants, bringing pressure to bear on Mr and Mrs W to take white children only, had 'incited' them to do so. It followed that, since it would have been unlawful discrimination under the Act for Mr and Mrs W to take white children only, it was, by virtue of s12, unlawful for the defendants to incite them to do so.

Invicta Plastics Ltd v Clare [] The defendant had advertised a device with a photograph showing a view of a speed restriction sign, implying that it could be used to detect police radar traps. It was not an offence to own one of these devices, but it was an offence to operate one without a licence. In confirming the company's conviction for inciting readers of the adverts to commit breaches of the Wireless Telegraphy Act , the Divisional Court held that the mens rea involved not only an intention to incite, but also an intention that the incitee should act upon the incitement.

R v Curr [] 2 QB The defendant ran a loan business whereby he would lend money to women with children in return for their handing over their signed family allowance books. He would then use other women to cash the family allowance vouchers. He was convicted of inciting the commission of offences under s9 b of the Family Allowance Act , which made it an offence for any person to receive any sum by way of family allowance knowing it was not properly payable.

He appealed successfully to the Court of Appeal, where it was held that the trial judge had erred in not directing the jury to consider whether these women, who were being incited to use the signed allowance books to collect money on behalf of the defendant, had actually known that what they were being asked to do was unlawful. It would have been more appropriate to have charged the defendant as the principal offender relying on the doctrine of innocent agency.

R v Fitzmaurice [] The defendant's father had asked the defendant to recruit people to rob a woman on her way to the bank by snatching wages from her. The defendant approached B and encouraged him to take part in the proposed robbery. Unknown to the defendant, no crime was to be committed at all; it was a plan of his father's to enable him to collect reward money from the police for providing false information about a false robbery.

The defendant was convicted of inciting B to commit robbery by robbing a woman near the bank. He appealed against conviction on the ground that what he had incited had in fact been impossible to carry out. It was held that 1 At common law incitement to commit an offence could not be committed where it was impossible to commit the offence alleged to have been incited. Accordingly, it was necessary to analyse the evidence to decide the precise offence which the defendant was alleged to have incited and whether it was possible to commit that offence.

It followed that the defendant had been rightly convicted. In dismissing the appeal, Glidewell LJ pointed out that the provision does not enable a wife to escape liability simply by taking care only to agree with her spouse, even though she knows of the existence of other parties to the conspiracy. Only where she remained genuinely ignorant of other parties to such a conspiracy would s2 2 a protect her. R v Anderson [] The defendant agreed for a fee to supply diamond wire to cut through prison bars in order to enable another to escape from prison.

He claimed that he only intended to supply the wire and then go abroad. He believed the plan could never succeed. He appealed against his conviction for conspiring with others to effect the release of one of them from prison, claiming that as he did not intend or expect the plan to be carried out, he lacked the necessary mens rea for the offence of conspiracy.

The House of Lords dismissed the appeal. Lord Bridge stated that beyond the mere fact of agreement, the necessary mens rea of the crime is established if it is shown that the accused, when he entered into the agreement, intended to play some part in the agreed course of conduct in furtherance of the criminal purpose which the agreed course of conduct was intended to achieve.

On the facts of the case, the defendant clearly intended, by providing diamond wire to be smuggled into the prison, to play a part in the agreed course of conduct in furtherance of the criminal objective. Yip Chiu-Cheung v R [] The defendant had entered into an agreement with an undercover police officer, whereby the officer would fly from Australia to Hong Kong, collect a consignment of heroin from the defendant, and return with it to Australia.

In due course, however, the defendant was charged with, and convicted of, conspiring to traffic in dangerous drugs. He appealed on the ground that there could be no conspiracy as his co-conspirator had been acting to promote law enforcement, and that the officer's purpose had been to expose drug-trafficking. The appeal was dismissed by the Privy Council.

Even though the officer would have been acting courageously and from the best of motives, it had nevertheless been his intention, at the time the agreement was made, to take prohibited drugs from Hong Kong to Australia. If the agreement had been executed he would have committed a serious criminal offence. It followed that there had been a conspiracy and the defendant had been properly convicted.

Scott v MPC [] The defendant agreed with the employees of cinema owners that, in return for payment, they would remove films without the consent of their employers or of the owners of the copyright, in order that the defendant could make copies infringing the copyright, and distribute them for profit.

The defendant argued that the conspiracy charged did not involve any deceit of the companies and persons who owned the copyright. The House of Lords held that the defendant was guilty of a conspiracy to defraud and that it did not necessarily involve deceit. Wai Yu-Tsang v R [] The defendant was convicted of conspiring to defraud a bank, of which he was the chief accountant.

He had agreed with others not to enter certain dishonoured cheques on the records of the bank in order to save the bank's reputation. The trial judge's direction to the jury, with which the Privy Council agreed, was to the effect that for conspiracy to defraud, no desire to cause loss on the part of the defendant need be shown, it being sufficient that he had imperiled the economic or proprietary interests of another party.

The House of Lords held that an offence of conspiracy to corrupt public morals existed at common law. The conspiracy to corrupt public morals consisted of an agreement to corrupt public morals by means of the magazine; and the defendants had been rightly convicted.

Knuller v DPP [] The defendant and others had published adverts in a contact magazine aimed at homosexuals, encouraging them to have sexual relations with each other. The House of Lords held that an agreement to publish adverts to facilitate the commission of homosexual acts between adult males in private was a conspiracy to corrupt public morals, although such conduct is no longer a crime. Lord Reid believed that no licence was given to others to encourage the practice.

A majority of the House held that there is also a common law offence of outraging public decency. The exhibit was entitled 'Human Earrings'. The gallery was open to, and was visited by, members of the public. The defendants were charged with, and convicted of, outraging public decency contrary to common law.

He was convicted of attempted theft and appealed on the ground that his acts were not sufficiently proximate to the completed offence of theft to be capable of comprising an attempt to commit theft. His conviction was quashed. He had not gone beyond mere preparation. It remained for him to go to the bookmaker and demand his money.

R v Jones The defendant had bought some guns, shortened the barrel of one of them, put on a disguise and had gone to the place where his intended victim, F, dropped his daughter off for school. As the girl left the car, the defendant jumped into the rear seat and asked F to drive on. The defendant was convicted of attempted murder and appealed. In dismissing his appeal Taylor LJ felt that there was evidence from which a reasonable jury, properly directed, could conclude that the defendant had done acts which were more than merely preparatory.

His Lordship pointed out that the defendant's actions in obtaining, shortening and loading the gun, and in putting on his disguise and going to the school could only be regarded as preparatory acts. But once he had got into the car, taken out the loaded gun and pointed it at the victim with the intention of killing him, there was sufficient evidence for the consideration of the jury on the charge of attempted murder.

R v Campbell The defendant planned to rob a post-office. He drove a motorbike to near the office, parked it and approached, wearing a crash helmet. He was carrying an imitation gun and a threatening note which he planned to pass to the cashier in the post office.

He was walking down the street and when one yard from the post office door, police, who had been tipped off, grabbed the defendant and arrested him. He was convicted of attempted robbery and appealed. In allowing the appeal, Watkins LJ stated that in order to effect the robbery it would have been quite impossible unless he entered the post office, gone to the counter and made some kind of hostile act directed at whoever was behind the counter and in a position to hand him money.

A number of acts remained undone and the series of acts which he had already performed - namely, making his way from his home, dismounting from the cycle and walking towards the post office door - were clearly acts which were indicative of mere preparation. If a person, in circumstances such as this, has not even gained the place where he could be in a position to carry out the offence, it is extremely unlikely that it could ever be said that he had performed an act which could be properly said to be an attempt.

Note: The appropriate charge would have been going equipped with intent to steal. A-G's Reference No 1 of The defendant was charged with attempted rape. He had pushed the victim to the ground, removed some of her undergarments, and lain on top of her.

In any case, the best option would be to inform any potential employer about any pending case or past convictions, though such a voluntary declaration is not required or mandated. An employer can legally take action against someone who actively discloses incorrect or misleading information on their verification form. A three-judge bench of the Supreme Court enumerated the principles to be followed by employers when dealing with the suppression of information or submission of false information by potential employees in the verification form with respect to prosecution, arrest or pendency of a criminal case in the case of Avtar Singh vs.

Union of India. The following guidelines were laid down-. The effect of a criminal case on employment varies according to the kind of offence and job. Most employers have their own policies regarding employment of people with criminal records. However, jobs of a sensitive nature may refuse employment to a person convicted of an offence of moral turpitude.

Under Section 6 2 of the Passports Act, , the passport authority can refuse a foreign visa to any applicant if-. Mere registration of an FIR will not result in any adverse effect on employment. Proceedings must have been started in a court, or the person must be convicted of the offence for any adverse effect on their job.

In case of a registered FIR, the best option is to institute proceedings to quash it in court under Section of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Asper Section 2 s of the Industrial Disputes Act, , a workman is defined as any person employed in an industry to do any manual, unskilled, skilled, technical, operational, clerical or supervisory work for hire or reward. This does not include an employee employed in the managerial, administrative or supervisory capacity. Section 25F further defines the conditions that must be fulfilled before the termination of a workman.

An employer must-. Under the Constitution of India, a government servant can only be terminated on the grounds for unnecessary absenteeism or for proven misconduct. A terminated employee also has the right to appeal the termination on statutory or contractual grounds in front of the jurisdictional labour authorities.

This may be done if the employer has failed to provide a reason for termination, the dismissal is unfair or if misconduct has not been established. This was all about the impact of a past or ongoing civil or criminal case on your job. What are your views on the impact of a past or ongoing civil or criminal case on your job? Comment below and let us know. LawSikho has created a telegram group for exchanging legal knowledge, referrals and various opportunities.

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Section 25F further defines the conditions that must be fulfilled before the termination of a workman. An employer must-. Under the Constitution of India, a government servant can only be terminated on the grounds for unnecessary absenteeism or for proven misconduct. A terminated employee also has the right to appeal the termination on statutory or contractual grounds in front of the jurisdictional labour authorities. This may be done if the employer has failed to provide a reason for termination, the dismissal is unfair or if misconduct has not been established.

This was all about the impact of a past or ongoing civil or criminal case on your job. What are your views on the impact of a past or ongoing civil or criminal case on your job? Comment below and let us know. LawSikho has created a telegram group for exchanging legal knowledge, referrals and various opportunities.

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Join telegram group. There was evidence that she had behaved absent-mindedly in the home. She said that she must have put the items in her bag in a moment of absentmindedness. Her doctor and a consultant psychiatrist testified that she was suffering from depression, which the consultant accepted to be a minor mental illness which could produce absent-mindedness. The trial judge was convinced that the defence was in truth a defence of insanity. However, the Court of Appeal held that the M'Naghten Rules do not apply to those who retain the power of reasoning but who in moments of confusion or absent-mindedness fail to use their powers to the full.

R v Windle [] 2 QB The defendant had killed his wife by administering an overdose of aspirins to her. The trial judge refused to allow the defence of insanity to go to the jury on the ground that he had known his actions were unlawful.

This decision was upheld on appeal. The defendant had been charged with reckless driving, having used a van to smash through the entrance gates of a Butlins' holiday camp. The defendant contended that he had not driven recklessly because, although he knew there was a risk of his causing criminal damage, he felt that he was able to cope with it because he was being instructed to act by God.

The Court of Appeal held, dismissing the appeal that as the defendant had been aware of his actions he could not have been in a state of automatism, and the fact that he believed himself to be driven by God could not provide an excuse, but merely an explanation for what he had done. In other words he could not rely on the defence of insanity either because the evidence was that he had known what he was doing, or had known that what he was doing was illegal.

The defendant had been convicted of various counts alleging actual bodily harm, and assaults upon police officers. The offences had occurred after the defendant had consumed large quantities of alcohol and drugs. The trial judge had directed the jury that self-induced intoxication was not available as a defence to these basic intent crimes. The defendant was convicted and appealed unsuccessfully to the Court of Appeal and the House of Lords.

Lord Elwyn-Jones LC referred to the case of Beard in which Lord Birkenhead LC concluded that the cases he had considered establish that drunkenness can be a defence where the accused was at the time of the offence so drunk as to be incapable of forming the specific intent necessary for such crimes.

Lord Elwyn-Jones LC then said that before and since Beard's case, judges had taken the view that self-induced intoxication, however gross and even if it produced a condition akin to automatism, cannot excuse crimes of basic intent. The defendant, having voluntarily consumed LSD, had the illusion of descending to the centre of the earth and being attacked by snakes.

He claimed to have had no knowledge of what he was doing and no intention to harm her. His defence of intoxication was rejected at his trial and he was convicted of unlawful act manslaughter. His appeal to the Court of Appeal was dismissed. The defendant had voluntarily consumed up to seven old valium tablets a non-controlled drug having a sedative effect for the purpose of calming his nerves. Whilst under the influence of the drug he had started a fire in the flat in which he had been living, but claimed to have been unable to remember anything after taking the tablets.

The defendant was convicted of causing criminal damage being reckless as to whether life would be endangered, following the trial judge's direction to the jury that self-induced intoxication was not available by way of defence to a basic intent crime. The defendant appealed. The conviction was quashed on appeal on the grounds that he could not be expected to anticipate that tranquillisers would have that effect upon him. The Court of Appeal held that the trial judge should have distinguished valium, a sedative, from other types of drugs, such as alcohol, which were widely known to have socially unacceptable side effects.

Whilst the voluntary consumption of dangerous drugs might be conclusive proof of recklessness, no such presumption was justified in the case of non-dangerous drugs. The jury should have been directed to consider whether the defendant had been reckless in consuming the valium, in the sense that he had been aware of the risks associated with its consumption, although not necessarily aware of the risk that he would actually commit aggravated criminal damage.

Ireland v Gallagher [] AC The defendant decided to kill his wife. Then he killed her with the knife. He subsequently claimed that he was so drunk that he did not know what he was doing, or possibly even that the drink had brought on a latent psychopathic state so that he was insane at the time of the killing.

The House of Lords held that intoxication could not be a defence in either case as the intent had been clearly formed, albeit before the killing took place. He cannot say that he got himself into such a stupid state that he was incapable of an intent to kill.

So also when he is a psychopath, he cannot by drinking rely on his selfinduced defect of reason as a defence of insanity. The wickedness of his mind before he got drunk is enough to condemn him, coupled with the act which he intended to do and did do. The defendant had drunk wine not knowing that it was extremely strong home-made wine. He then committed sexual offences, but claimed that he was so drunk that he did not know what he was doing.

The Court of Appeal held that this did not amount to involuntary intoxication. He was thus treated as if he were voluntarily intoxicated. The defendant was guilty of manslaughter as death arose from an unlawful act, ie taking another's property and throwing it into the sea.

R v Lamb [] 2 QB The defendant pointed a loaded gun at his friend in jest. He did not intend to injure or alarm the victim and the victim was not alarmed. There were two bullets in the chambers but neither was in the chamber opposite the barrel.

Because they did not understand how a revolver works, both thought there was no danger in pulling the trigger. But when the defendant did so, the barrel rotated placing a bullet opposite the firing pin and the victim was killed. The defendant was not guilty of a criminal assault or battery because he did not foresee that his victim would be alarmed or injured. R v Arobieke [] Crim LR The defendant had been convicted of manslaughter on the basis that his presence at a railway station had caused the victim, whom he knew to be terrified of him, to attempt an escape by crossing the railway tracks, with the result that he was electrocuted.

The Court of Appeal quashed the conviction on the ground that there had been no criminal act by the defendant, as the evidence did not show that the defendant had physically threatened or chased the deceased. The victim had consented to a number of such injections during the course of an evening.

The following morning he was found to have died from the effects of the drug-taking. The defendant was convicted of maliciously administering a noxious substance contrary to s23 of the Offences Against the Person Act , and of manslaughter, either on the basis that his unlawful act had caused death, or on the basis that he had recklessly caused the victim's death.

The Court of Appeal held that the defendant had been properly convicted. Lord Widgery CJ stated that heroin was a noxious substance on the basis that it was likely to injure in common use, and that the defendant had administered it knowing of its noxious qualities. The victim's consent to suffer harm of this nature could never relieve the defendant of his liability, or destroy the unlawfulness of the defendant's act. She mocked his impotence and he had attacked her, knocking her out.

The defendant panicked, and wrongfully thinking he had killed her, threw her unconscious body into a river, where she drowned. The defendant was convicted of manslaughter. He had acted unlawfully towards the victim in a way that sober and reasonable people would appreciate involved risk of injury to the victim. The cashier at the petrol station was a 60 year old man who, unknown to the defendants, suffered from a heart disease. Dawson had pointed a replica handgun at the victim and his partner had banged a pick-axe handle on the counter.

Money was demanded, but the victim pressed the alarm button and the defendants fled empty handed. Shortly afterwards the victim collapsed and died from a heart attack. The defendants were convicted and successfully appealed to the Court of Appeal, following a misdirection by the trial judge.

Watkins LJ held that a if the jury acted upon the basis that emotional disturbance was enough to constitute harm then, they would have done so upon a misdirection. A proper direction would have been that the requisite harm is caused if the unlawful act so shocks the victim as to cause him physical injury. It was never suggested that any of the defendants knew that their victim had a bad heart; therefore the reasonable man would not know this. R v Watson [] 1 WLR The defendant had burgled a house occupied by an 87 year old man who suffered from a heart condition.

The defendant disturbed the victim, and verbally abused him, but made off without stealing anything. The police were called shortly afterwards, and a local council workman arrived to repair the windows broken by the defendant in gaining entry. An hour and a half after the burglary the victim had a heart attack and died. The defendant was convicted of manslaughter but appealed successfully on the issue of causation as to which see below.

As to the nature of the unlawful act however, the Court of Appeal recognised that, following Dawson and applying the test established by Watkins LJ, the unlawful act had to be dangerous in the sense that all sober and reasonable persons would foresee that it created a risk of some physical harm occurring to the victim, but added that in applying this test, the reasonable person was to be imbued with all the knowledge that the defendant had gained throughout his burglarious trespass ie his realisation of the victim's frailty and not just the defendant's limited or non-existent knowledge at the moment he first entered the property.

Note: On this basis therefore, the burglary did constitute a dangerous unlawful act, but only because the court assumed that the defendant, during the course of the unlawful act, must have become aware of the frailty of the victim. R v Ball [] Crim LR The defendant had been involved in a dispute with his neighbour, the victim, over her parking her vehicle on his land.

The victim, accompanied by two men, called on the defendant to investigate the disappearance of her vehicle. An argument developed which culminated in the defendant grabbing a handful of cartridges, loading his shotgun, and firing at the victim. The victim was killed in the attack. The defendant was acquitted of murder, on the basis that he had honestly believed that he had loaded the gun with blank cartridges and had only intended to frighten the victim, but was convicted of manslaughter.

The defendant appealed on the basis that the trial judge had erred in directing the jury as to how they should have assessed the 'dangerousness' of his unlawful act, in that they had not been told to bear in mind the defendant's mistaken belief, that he was firing blanks, when applying the Dawson test. In dismissing the appeal, the Court of Appeal held that once it was established that the defendant had intentionally committed an unlawful act, the question of its dangerousness was to be decided by applying the objective test as in Dawson.

The court refused to impute to the reasonable man the defendant's mistake of fact, ie believing the live cartridges to be blanks. He gave some of the tablets to the victim, also known to be a drug addict. The victim had consumed a large quantity of the drug in one session, and subsequently injected himself with other substances. The following morning he was found to have died of a drug overdose. The defendant was convicted of unlawful act manslaughter, based on his unlawful supply of the controlled drug, and he appealed on the basis that his supply of the drug was not a dangerous act which had operated as the direct cause of death.

He contended that the death was due to the victim's act in consuming such a large dose of the drug in such a short space of time. The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, Waller LJ holding that the defendant's act had not in any event been the direct cause of death, but had merely made it possible for the victim to kill himself. His Lordship stated that where manslaughter was based on an unlawful and dangerous act, it had to be an act directed at the victim which was likely to cause immediate injury, albeit slight.

R v Mitchell [] 2 WLR The defendant, having become involved in an argument whilst queuing in a post office, pushed an elderly man, causing him to fall accidentally on the deceased, an elderly woman, who subsequently died in hospital from her injuries. The defendant was convicted of unlawful act manslaughter. He unsuccessfully appealed on the ground that his unlawful act had not been directed at the victim. Staughton J held that although there was no direct contact between the defendant and the victim, she was injured as a direct and immediate result of his act.

Thereafter her death occurred. The only question was one of causation and the jury had concluded that the victim's death was caused by the defendant's act. The actions of the elderly man in falling on the victim were entirely foreseeable and did not break the chain of causation between the defendant's assault and the victim's death. Dalby was distinguishable on its facts as a case where the victim was not injured as a direct and immediate result of the defendant's act.

In addition, the court saw no reason of policy for holding that an act calculated to harm A cannot be manslaughter if it in fact kills B: see Latimer R v Goodfellow 83 Cr App R 23 The defendant had deliberately fire bombed his own council house in the hope that he would be rehoused by the council. His wife and children, who had been in the house, were killed in the ensuing blaze. He appealed against his conviction for manslaughter on the ground that his unlawful act criminal damage had not been directed at the victims as required by Dalby.

The Court of Appeal held that Dalby should not be construed as requiring proof of an intention on the part of the defendant to harm the victims. It was to be viewed as an authority on causation, in that the prosecution had to establish that there had been no fresh intervening cause between the defendant's act and the death. The defendant appealed successfully on the ground that his counsel had been denied a sufficient opportunity to address the jury on the issue of whether the excitement caused by the arrival of the police and the council workman could have taken over as the operating and substantial cause of death.

Note: But did this predictable event break the chain of causation? The object struck and killed the guard who had been sitting in the driver's compartment. The defendants were convicted of manslaughter, and unsuccessfully appealed, on the ground that they had not foreseen that their actions might cause harm to any other person. Lord Salmon explained that a defendant was guilty of manslaughter if it was proved that he intentionally did an act which was unlawful and dangerous and that act caused death, and that it was unnecessary that the defendant had known that the act in question was unlawful or dangerous.

She claimed that she had not meant to kill but had foreseen death or grievous bodily harm as a highly probable result of her actions. Ackner J directed the jury that the defendant was guilty if she knew that it was highly probable that her act would cause at least serious bodily harm.

Although Lord Hailsham LC stated that he did not think that foresight of a high degree of probability is at all the same thing as intention, and it is not foresight but intention which constitiutes the mental element in murder, the House of Lords by a majority , held that foresight on the part of the defendant that his actions were likely, or highly likely, to cause death or grievous bodily harm was sufficient mens rea for murder.

The defendants were striking miners who threw a concrete block from a bridge onto the motorway below. It struck a taxi that was carrying a working miner and killed the driver. The defendants argued that they only intended to block the road but not to kill or cause grievous bodily harm. The trial judge directed the jury on the basis of Lord Bridge's statements in Moloney ie, was death or grievous bodily harm a natural consequence of what was done, and did the defendants foresee that consequence as a natural consequence?

On appeal a verdict of manslaughter was substituted by the House of Lords who reaffirmed that the prosecution has to establish an intention to kill or do grievous bodily harm on the part of the defendant. Lord Scarman felt that the Moloney guidelines on the relationship between foresight and intention were unsatisfactory as they were likely to mislead a jury.

Lord Scarman expressed the view that intention was not to be equated with foresight of consequences, but that intention could be established if there was evidence of foresight. The jury should therefore consider whether the defendant foresaw a consequence.

It should be explained to the jury that the greater the probability of a consequence occurring, the more likely that it was foreseen, and the more likely that it was foreseen, the more likely it is that it was intended. In short, foresight was to be regarded as evidence of intention, not as an alternative form of it. R v Nedrick 83 Cr App A child had burned to death in a house where the defendant had, without warning, put a petrol bomb through the letter box. He admitted to starting the fire but stated that he only wanted to frighten the owner of the house.

The Court of Appeal overturned the murder conviction and substituted a verdict of manslaughter as the judge had misdirected the jury. Lord Lane CJ provided a model direction for a jury about intent in a murder case where the defendant did a manifestly dangerous act and someone died as a result. Lord Lane CJ suggested that when determining whether the defendant had the necessary intent, it might be helpful for a jury to ask themselves two questions: 1 How probable was the consequence which resulted from the defendant's voluntary act?

The defendants threw their victim from a third floor balcony. However, Lloyd LJ stated that in the rare cases where an expanded direction is required in terms of foresight, courts should continue to use virtual certainty as the test, rather than high probability. R v Scalley [] Crim LR The defendant was alleged to have murdered a 5 year old boy by setting fire to a house in which the defendant had once lived.

The defendant was convicted of murder following the trial judge's direction to the jury to the effect thy could convict if they were sure that the defendant intended death or grievous bodily harm in the sense that he foresaw either consequence as virtually certain to result from his actions. The Court of Appeal quashed the conviction and substituted a conviction for manslaughter. The direction did not make it clear that foresight of the virtual certainty of death or serious injury is not intention but merely evidence from which the jury are entitled to infer intention.

The jury should have been told that if they were satisfied that the defendant did see either death or serious injury as virtually certain, then they could go on to infer intention but were not obliged to do so.

The defendant had broken a gas meter to steal the money in it with the result that gas escaped into the next-door house. The victim became ill and her life was endangered. In this context recklessness involved the defendant in being aware of the risk that his actions might cause the prohibited consequence. The defendant, who had been sacked from his employment at an hotel, became drunk and returned at night to the hotel, setting it on fire.

There were ten people resident in the hotel at the time, but the fire was discovered and extinguished before any serious harm could be caused. The defendant pleaded guilty to criminal damage but pleaded not guilty to the more serious charge of criminal damage with intent to endanger life or recklessness as to whether life would be endangered.

The House of Lords re-affirmed Cunningham as a form of recklessness in criminal law, but introduced an alternative form of recklessness based upon the defendant's failure to advert to a risk which would have been obvious to the reasonable person. Elliot v C [] 1 WLR The defendant, an educationally subnormal year-old schoolgirl, had entered a neighbour's garden shed, poured white spirit on the floor and ignited it.

The defendant then fled as the shed burst into flames. The magistrates dismissed the charge of criminal damage on the basis that she gave no thought to the risk of damage, and that even if she had, she would not have been capable of appreciating it. The prosecution appealed and the Divisional Court, allowing the appeal, held that this was irrelevant to the issue of recklessness. R v Coles [] Crim LR The defendant, aged 15 at the time of the offence and of lower than average mental capacity, had been playing in a hay barn with other children.

The evidence was that he had tried to set fire to the hay whilst other children were in the barn. The children escaped unhurt. The defendant was charged with arson, being reckless as to whether the lives of others would be endangered. During the trial it was submitted that the Caldwell direction should be amended so that the assessment of whether or not the appellant had, by his actions, created an obvious risk of harm, should be made more subjective.

The trial judge rejected this submission stating that the test was whether or not the risk would have been obvious to the reasonable prudent adult person. It was held that the first limb of the Caldwell direction was objective and the state of mind of the accused was irrelevant to the question of whether or not he had, by his act or omission, created an obvious risk of harm to persons or property.

On appeal, the argument put forward on behalf of the appellant had been broadened to encompass the proposition that the second limb of the Caldwell test should have some regard to the defendant's capacity to foresee risk. It was not predisposed to depart from its own previous decision. The defendant was a martial arts expert who was demonstrating his skill to friends by performing a move which he anticipated would bring his foot within inches of a shop window.

He had miscalculated the risk, and he broke the window. The argument that he was not reckless because he had given thought to the risk but mistakenly believed that he had minimised it, was rejected by the Divisional Court because he knew there was some risk. The defendant was found guilty of causing criminal damage. R v Merrick [] 1 Cr App R The defendant visited householders and offered to remove certain old cable TV cabling if they were not being paid wayleave payments by the owner of the cables with whom he had fallen out.

When the defendant removed the cable he inevitably damaged it. He also inevitably left a live cable exposed for a short time until he could make it safe about six minutes. He was charged with intentionally damaging property being reckless as to whether life was endangered thereby. At his trial, he argued that he knew that it would have been dangerous to leave the cable exposed, that he had come with materials to make it safe and that he did not believe that there was any risk of endangering life whilst he was doing so.

The judge ruled that precautions to eliminate the risk of endangering life must be taken before the damage was caused. On appeal the defendant argued that he was not reckless since he fell within the lacuna as having thought about it and decided that there was no risk. The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal and held that there is a difference between a avoiding a risk and b taking steps to remedy one which has already been created. The defendant could only have succeeded if he had done or believed he had done the former rather than the latter.

R v Lawrence [] AC The defendant motor cyclist, who had collided with and killed a pedestrian, was charged with causing death by reckless driving. R v Seymour [] 2 AC The defendant had an argument with his common law wife. In an effort to move her car out of his way by pushing it with his truck, he had jammed her body between his truck and her car, as a result of which she sustained severe injuries from which she later died. The prosecution brought a charge of common law manslaughter and the defendant was convicted.

The trial judge had directed the jury that they should convict if they were satisfied that the defendant had caused the death, and had been reckless in so doing, recklessness here having the meaning attributed to it by the House of Lords in Lawrence. The House of Lords held that the conviction should stand. Thus Caldwell recklessness applied to manslaughter. The defendant struck a blow with his belt at Horace Chapple which recoiled off him, severely injuring an innocent bystander.

The defendant was convicted of maliciously wounding the victim, and appealed on the ground that it had never been his intention to hurt her. The court held that the conviction would be affirmed. The defendant had committed the actus reus of the offence with the necessary mens rea, ie he had acted maliciously. There was no requirement in the relevant act that his mens rea should relate to a named victim.

Thus, Latimer's malice was transferred from his intended to his unintended victim. The defendant threw a stone at another person during an argument. The stone missed the intended victim, but instead broke a nearby window. He was charged with malicious damage to property and was convicted. The court, in quashing the conviction held, that the doctrine of transferred malice was inapplicable where the defendant's intention had not been to cause the type of harm that actually occurred.

His intention to assault another person could not be used as the mens rea for the damage that he had caused to the window. The defendant accidentally drove his car on to a policeman's foot and when he realised, he refused to remove it immediately. It was held that the actus reus of the assault was a continuing act which, while started without mens rea, was still in progress at the time the mens rea was formed and so there was a coincidence of actus reus and mens rea sufficient to found criminal liability.

Kaitamaki v R [] AC The defendant was charged with rape. His defence was that when he penetrated the woman he thought she was consenting. When he realised that she objected he did not withdraw. The Privy Council held that the actus reus of rape was a continuing act, and when he realised that she did not consent and he therefore formed the mens rea the actus reus was still in progress and there could therefore be coincidence. The defendants had taken their intended victim to a hut and plied him with drink so that he became intoxicated.

They then hit the victim around the head, intending to kill him. In fact the defendants only succeeded in knocking him unconscious, but believing the victim to be dead, they threw his body over a cliff. The victim survived but died of exposure some time later. The defendants were convicted of murder, and appealed to the Privy Council on the ground that there had been no coincidence of the mens rea and actus reus of murder.

The Privy Council held that the correct view of what the defendants had done was to treat the chain of events as a continuing actus reus. The actus reus of causing death started with the victim being struck on the head and continued until he died of exposure. It was sufficient for the prosecution to establish that at some time during that chain of events the defendants had acted with the requisite mens rea.

R v Church [] 1 QB The same reasoning was applied in this case even though there was no pre-conceived plan. The defendant had gone to his van with a woman for sexual purposes. She had mocked his impotence and he had attacked her, knocking her out. The defendant panicked, and wrongly thinking he had killed her, threw her unconscious body into a river, where she drowned. The defendant's appeal against his conviction for manslaughter was dismissed by the Court of Appeal. The defendant punched his wife on the chin knocking her unconscious.

He did not intend to cause her serious harm. The defendant attempted to move her body, and in the course of so doing dropped her, causing her head to strike the pavement. His wife sustained fractures to the skull that proved fatal. That is certainly so where the appellant's subsequent actions which caused death, after the initial unlawful blow, are designed to conceal his commission of the original unlawful assault.

They had written threatening letters, distributed circulars and held public meetings in an attempt to persuade the married couple to stop fostering black children. The RRB sought a declaration that the defendants' acts were unlawful under s12 of the Race Relations Act , which makes it unlawful to discriminate in the public provision of services, and an injunction restraining them from inciting a person to do an act which was unlawful under the Act.

It was held, by the Court of Appeal Civil Division that the defendants had 'incited' Mr and Mrs W, within s12 of the Act, to discriminate unlawfully. The word 'incite' in s12 was not limited to advice, encouragement or persuasion of another to do an act but included threatening or bringing pressure to bear on a person.

Accordingly the defendants, bringing pressure to bear on Mr and Mrs W to take white children only, had 'incited' them to do so. It followed that, since it would have been unlawful discrimination under the Act for Mr and Mrs W to take white children only, it was, by virtue of s12, unlawful for the defendants to incite them to do so.

Invicta Plastics Ltd v Clare [] The defendant had advertised a device with a photograph showing a view of a speed restriction sign, implying that it could be used to detect police radar traps. It was not an offence to own one of these devices, but it was an offence to operate one without a licence.

In confirming the company's conviction for inciting readers of the adverts to commit breaches of the Wireless Telegraphy Act , the Divisional Court held that the mens rea involved not only an intention to incite, but also an intention that the incitee should act upon the incitement.

R v Curr [] 2 QB The defendant ran a loan business whereby he would lend money to women with children in return for their handing over their signed family allowance books. He would then use other women to cash the family allowance vouchers. He was convicted of inciting the commission of offences under s9 b of the Family Allowance Act , which made it an offence for any person to receive any sum by way of family allowance knowing it was not properly payable.

He appealed successfully to the Court of Appeal, where it was held that the trial judge had erred in not directing the jury to consider whether these women, who were being incited to use the signed allowance books to collect money on behalf of the defendant, had actually known that what they were being asked to do was unlawful. It would have been more appropriate to have charged the defendant as the principal offender relying on the doctrine of innocent agency. R v Fitzmaurice [] The defendant's father had asked the defendant to recruit people to rob a woman on her way to the bank by snatching wages from her.

The defendant approached B and encouraged him to take part in the proposed robbery. Unknown to the defendant, no crime was to be committed at all; it was a plan of his father's to enable him to collect reward money from the police for providing false information about a false robbery.

The defendant was convicted of inciting B to commit robbery by robbing a woman near the bank. He appealed against conviction on the ground that what he had incited had in fact been impossible to carry out. It was held that 1 At common law incitement to commit an offence could not be committed where it was impossible to commit the offence alleged to have been incited.

Accordingly, it was necessary to analyse the evidence to decide the precise offence which the defendant was alleged to have incited and whether it was possible to commit that offence. It followed that the defendant had been rightly convicted. In dismissing the appeal, Glidewell LJ pointed out that the provision does not enable a wife to escape liability simply by taking care only to agree with her spouse, even though she knows of the existence of other parties to the conspiracy.

Only where she remained genuinely ignorant of other parties to such a conspiracy would s2 2 a protect her. R v Anderson [] The defendant agreed for a fee to supply diamond wire to cut through prison bars in order to enable another to escape from prison.

He claimed that he only intended to supply the wire and then go abroad. He believed the plan could never succeed. He appealed against his conviction for conspiring with others to effect the release of one of them from prison, claiming that as he did not intend or expect the plan to be carried out, he lacked the necessary mens rea for the offence of conspiracy. The House of Lords dismissed the appeal.

Lord Bridge stated that beyond the mere fact of agreement, the necessary mens rea of the crime is established if it is shown that the accused, when he entered into the agreement, intended to play some part in the agreed course of conduct in furtherance of the criminal purpose which the agreed course of conduct was intended to achieve.

On the facts of the case, the defendant clearly intended, by providing diamond wire to be smuggled into the prison, to play a part in the agreed course of conduct in furtherance of the criminal objective. Yip Chiu-Cheung v R [] The defendant had entered into an agreement with an undercover police officer, whereby the officer would fly from Australia to Hong Kong, collect a consignment of heroin from the defendant, and return with it to Australia.

In due course, however, the defendant was charged with, and convicted of, conspiring to traffic in dangerous drugs. He appealed on the ground that there could be no conspiracy as his co-conspirator had been acting to promote law enforcement, and that the officer's purpose had been to expose drug-trafficking.

The appeal was dismissed by the Privy Council. Even though the officer would have been acting courageously and from the best of motives, it had nevertheless been his intention, at the time the agreement was made, to take prohibited drugs from Hong Kong to Australia.

If the agreement had been executed he would have committed a serious criminal offence. It followed that there had been a conspiracy and the defendant had been properly convicted. Scott v MPC [] The defendant agreed with the employees of cinema owners that, in return for payment, they would remove films without the consent of their employers or of the owners of the copyright, in order that the defendant could make copies infringing the copyright, and distribute them for profit.

The defendant argued that the conspiracy charged did not involve any deceit of the companies and persons who owned the copyright. The House of Lords held that the defendant was guilty of a conspiracy to defraud and that it did not necessarily involve deceit. Wai Yu-Tsang v R [] The defendant was convicted of conspiring to defraud a bank, of which he was the chief accountant. He had agreed with others not to enter certain dishonoured cheques on the records of the bank in order to save the bank's reputation.

The trial judge's direction to the jury, with which the Privy Council agreed, was to the effect that for conspiracy to defraud, no desire to cause loss on the part of the defendant need be shown, it being sufficient that he had imperiled the economic or proprietary interests of another party. The House of Lords held that an offence of conspiracy to corrupt public morals existed at common law. The conspiracy to corrupt public morals consisted of an agreement to corrupt public morals by means of the magazine; and the defendants had been rightly convicted.

Knuller v DPP [] The defendant and others had published adverts in a contact magazine aimed at homosexuals, encouraging them to have sexual relations with each other. The House of Lords held that an agreement to publish adverts to facilitate the commission of homosexual acts between adult males in private was a conspiracy to corrupt public morals, although such conduct is no longer a crime.

Lord Reid believed that no licence was given to others to encourage the practice. A majority of the House held that there is also a common law offence of outraging public decency. The exhibit was entitled 'Human Earrings'. The gallery was open to, and was visited by, members of the public.

The defendants were charged with, and convicted of, outraging public decency contrary to common law. He was convicted of attempted theft and appealed on the ground that his acts were not sufficiently proximate to the completed offence of theft to be capable of comprising an attempt to commit theft. His conviction was quashed. He had not gone beyond mere preparation. It remained for him to go to the bookmaker and demand his money. R v Jones The defendant had bought some guns, shortened the barrel of one of them, put on a disguise and had gone to the place where his intended victim, F, dropped his daughter off for school.

As the girl left the car, the defendant jumped into the rear seat and asked F to drive on. The defendant was convicted of attempted murder and appealed. In dismissing his appeal Taylor LJ felt that there was evidence from which a reasonable jury, properly directed, could conclude that the defendant had done acts which were more than merely preparatory.

His Lordship pointed out that the defendant's actions in obtaining, shortening and loading the gun, and in putting on his disguise and going to the school could only be regarded as preparatory acts. But once he had got into the car, taken out the loaded gun and pointed it at the victim with the intention of killing him, there was sufficient evidence for the consideration of the jury on the charge of attempted murder. R v Campbell The defendant planned to rob a post-office.

He drove a motorbike to near the office, parked it and approached, wearing a crash helmet. He was carrying an imitation gun and a threatening note which he planned to pass to the cashier in the post office. He was walking down the street and when one yard from the post office door, police, who had been tipped off, grabbed the defendant and arrested him.

He was convicted of attempted robbery and appealed. In allowing the appeal, Watkins LJ stated that in order to effect the robbery it would have been quite impossible unless he entered the post office, gone to the counter and made some kind of hostile act directed at whoever was behind the counter and in a position to hand him money.

A number of acts remained undone and the series of acts which he had already performed - namely, making his way from his home, dismounting from the cycle and walking towards the post office door - were clearly acts which were indicative of mere preparation. If a person, in circumstances such as this, has not even gained the place where he could be in a position to carry out the offence, it is extremely unlikely that it could ever be said that he had performed an act which could be properly said to be an attempt.

Note: The appropriate charge would have been going equipped with intent to steal. A-G's Reference No 1 of The defendant was charged with attempted rape. He had pushed the victim to the ground, removed some of her undergarments, and lain on top of her. When the police arrived she was partially clothed, and the defendant had his trousers down. During the course of the trial the judge directed the jury to acquit, on the basis that there was insufficient evidence of the defendant having attempted to have sexual intercourse.

The defendant was acquitted. The Attorney-General referred the issue to the Court of Appeal. It is sufficient if there is evidence from which the intent can be inferred and there are proved acts which a jury could properly regard as more than merely preparatory to the commission of the offence.

For example, and merely as an example, in the present case the evidence of the young woman's distress, of the state of her clothing, and the position in which she was seen, together with the respondent's acts of dragging her up the steps, lowering his trousers and interfering with her private parts, and his answers to the police, left it open to a jury to conclude that the respondent had the necessary intent and had done acts which were more than merely preparatory.

In short that he had embarked on committing the offence itself. He had no connection with the school and no right to be there. He had a rucksack with him. A police officer saw him and shouted at him, but he left. In a cubicle in the lavatory block there was a cider can which had belonged to the defendant.

His rucksack was found in some bushes, containing a large kitchen knife, rope and a roll of masking tape. The defendant was arrested and identified by the teacher and some pupils. He was charged with attempted false imprisonment. The prosecution alleged that the presence of the cider can showed that the defendant had been inside a toilet cubicle, and that the contents of the rucksack could have been used to catch and restrain a boy entering the lavatory.

The defendant was convicted. It held that the line of demarcation between acts which were merely preparatory and acts which might amount to an attempt was not always clear or easy to recognise. There was no rule of thumb test, and there must always be an exercise of judgment based on the particular facts of the case. It was an accurate paraphrase of the statutory test to ask whether the available evidence could show that a defendant had done an act showed that he had actually tried to commit the offence in question, or whether he had only got ready or put himself in a position or equipped himself to do so.

In the present case there was not much room for doubt about the defendant's intention, and the evidence showed that he had made preparations, had equipped himself, had got ready, had put himself in a position to commit the offence charged, but he had never had any contact or communication with any pupil at the school. On the facts of the case the evidence was not sufficient in law to support a finding that the defendant had done an act which was more than merely preparatory to wrongfully imprisoning a person unknown.

R v Tosti and White The defendants had been seen by the owners of a farm, just before midnight, walking to the door of a barn, and examining the padlock. They saw that they were being watched, took fright and ran off. A car was parked in a nearby lay-by, and between the car and the barn, hidden in a hedge, was some oxygen cutting equipment.

There was sufficient evidence to connect T with the equipment. The defendants were convicted of attempted burglary. The defendants appealed against conviction on the ground that there was no evidence upon which the jury could have found that an attempted burglary had been committed. It was held by the Court of Appeal, dismissing the appeal, that the short question was whether it could be said that the defendants, in providing themselves with oxygen cutting equipment, driving to the scene, concealing the equipment in a hedge, approaching the door of the barn and bending down to examine how best to go about the job of breaking into the barn, had committed acts which were more than merely preparatory, and which amounted to acts done in the commission of the offence.

The question was essentially one of degree. It had been said in Geddes that the test was to ask whether the evidence if accepted could show that the defendant had done an act which showed that he had actually tried to commit the offence, or whether he had only got ready or put himself in a position or equipped himself to do so. Applying that guidance to the facts of the present case, the facts proved in evidence were sufficient for the judge to leave to the jury.

R v Toothill [] The victim lived in a house with a garden, which was situated in an isolated area. At about 11pm she saw the defendant standing a few feet from the rear of her house, apparently masturbating. She telephoned the police. He was arrested in the garden, where a knife and a glove were found. A condom was found in his pocket. The defendant admitted that he had knocked at the door to ask for directions as he could not find where he had parked his car.

He was charged with attempted burglary with intent to rape. The defendant was convicted and appealed on the ground that it was incumbent on the judge to look for evidence not merely of an attempt to burgle but also an attempt to commit rape, namely that he would have knowledge that there was a person in the house, to lay the foundation for a finding that that was what the defendant had in his mind.

In the present case, the actus reus of the offence was the act of entering the property as a trespasser. What converted it into burglary was the presence of the trespasser with the intention to commit one or other of the offences set out in s9 2 of the Theft Act The attempt was to do the act, not to have the intention. The crucial step that the defendant took, which established that he had gone beyond the preparatory to the executory stage of his plan, was that he knocked at the proposed victim's door.

They were opened by a paper boy and a paper girl who found that they contained an invitation to the recipients to engage in acts of indecency with the author. A third letter purported to offer the recipient work with a security company and requested a specimen of urine. All three letters were taken to the police.

At the instigation of the police the third paper boy went to meet the writer of the letter in a local park. There he saw the defendant, who asked him if he was looking for JJ, the signatory of the third letter. The defendant was arrested. A search of his home revealed a typewriter bearing the same typeface as that used in the letters and a letter written in similar terms to the other three found.

There was expert evidence that all four letters had almost certainly been written on that typewriter. The defendant's defence was that he had been set up. He was convicted of three counts of attempting to procure an act of gross indecency. One of the grounds of appeal was that the judge erred in ruling that there was a case to answer on Count 3 since the fact of leaving out the third letter was no more than a mere preparatory act and was insufficient to constitute an attempt in law.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal in respect of Count 3. Following the decision in Geddes , which helpfully illustrated where and how the line was drawn between acts which were merely preparatory and acts which could amount to an attempt, the terms of letter three, which did not contain an overtly sexual invitation, as compared with the terms of letters one and two, were not such as to amount to an unequivocal invitation and were not sufficiently approximate to the act of procurement to amount to an attempt.

R v Khan and others [] After a discotheque a year-old girl accompanied five youths in a car to a house where they were joined by other youths. Three youths raped her. The four defendants tried to do so but failed. The defendants were charged with attempted rape and appealed. It was argued that the judge misdirected the jury by telling them that, even if a defendant did not know the girl was not consenting, he was guilty of attempted rape if he tried unsuccessfully to have sexual intercourse, being reckless whether she consented or not - ie, it was sufficient that he could not care less whether she consented or not.

The Court of Appeal held that a man may commit the offence of attempted rape even though he is reckless whether the woman consents to sexual intercourse since the attempt relates to the physical activity and his mental state of recklessness relates, as in the offence of rape itself, not to that activity but to the absence of the woman's consent.

The appeals against conviction were dismissed. Attorney-General's Reference No 3 of [] The defendants threw a petrol bomb towards the victims, four of whom were inside their car and two of whom were on the pavement outside. It passed over the car and smashed against a nearby wall. The defendants' car then accelerated away. The defendants were charged with attempted arson, being reckless whether life be endangered, contrary to s1 2 of the Criminal Damage Act The trial judge ruled that, on a charge of attempt, intent to endanger life was required; recklessness was not sufficient.

The Court of Appeal held that on a charge of attempted aggravated arson, it was sufficient for the Crown to establish a specific intent to cause damage by fire and that the defendant was reckless as to whether life would thereby be endangered, because if the state of mind of the defendant was that he intended to damage property and was reckless as to whether the life of another would thereby be endangered, and while in that state of mind he did an act which was more than merely preparatory to the offence, he was guilty of attempting to commit that offence.

It was not necessary that he intended that the lives of others would be endangered by the damage which he intended. Haughton v Smith [] A van containing stolen goods was stopped by the police. It transpired that the van was proceeding to Hertfordshire where the defendant was to make arrangements for the disposal of the goods in the London area. In order to trap the defendant the van was allowed to proceed on its journey with policemen concealed inside.

The van was met by the defendant who began to play a prominent role in assisting in the disposal of the van and its load. Finally the trap was sprung and the defendant was arrested. The prosecutor was of the opinion that, once the police had taken charge of the van, the goods had been restored to lawful custody, and were therefore, no longer stolen goods. Accordingly the defendant was not charged with handling 'stolen goods', contrary to s22 Theft Act , but with attempting to handle stolen goods.

The House of Lords held that a person could only be convicted of an attempt to commit an offence in circumstances where the steps taken by him in order to commit the offence, if successfully accomplished, would have resulted in the commission of that offence. A person who carried out certain acts in the erroneous belief that those acts constituted an offence could not be convicted of an attempt to commit that offence because he had taken no steps towards the commission of an offence.

In order to constitute an offence under s22 of the Theft Act the goods had to be stolen goods at the time of the handling; it was irrelevant that the accused believed them to be stolen goods. It followed that, since the goods which the defendant had handled were not stolen goods, he could not be convicted of attempting to commit the offence of handling stolen goods. Anderton v Ryan [] The defendant had bought a video recorder, but later confessed to the police that she believed it to have been stolen property when she bought it.

The defendant was charged with attempting to handle stolen goods, although the prosecution was unable to prove that the video recorder had in fact been stolen property. The House of Lords by a majority of quashed the defendant's conviction on the ground that she could not be guilty of attempting to handle stolen goods unless such property was shown to have existed. A majority of their Lordships refused to accept that the defendant's belief that goods were stolen was sufficient of itself to result in liability.

Such a result may have been the aim of the Act but their Lordships felt that Parliament would have to express its intentions more clearly before the courts would be willing to impose liability solely on the basis of what the defendant had thought she was doing, as opposed to what she was actually doing. R v Shivpuri ]] The defendant was paid to act as a drugs courier.

He was required to collect a package containing drugs and to distribute its contents according to instructions which would be given to him. On collecting the package the defendant was arrested by police officers, and he confessed to them that he believed its contents to be either heroin or cannabis.

An analysis revealed the contents of the package not to be drugs, but a harmless vegetable substance. The defendant was convicted for attempting to be knowingly concerned in dealing with and harbouring a controlled drug, namely heroin. His appeal to the House of Lords was dismissed. Lord Bridge said, in applying s1 of the Criminal Attempts Act to the facts of the case, the first question to be asked was whether the defendant intended to commit the offence.

The answer was plainly yes.

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